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The objective of this thesis is to investigate the part played by 
analysts in incorporating information about earnings into stock-prices. 
Chapter 1 deals with the theoretical background. 
Chapter 2 presents the empirical evidence that accounting earnings 
have information value to the market. 
Evidence from chapter 3 indicates that information contained in 
analysts' earnings forecasts is incorporated into stock-prices. 
Assuming this to be correct, studying the time-profile of analysts' 
earnings forecasts gives an insight into the impounding process. 
Chapter 4 presents statistical methods for evaluating forecast 
accuracy and rationality. 
Chapter 5 reviews the empirical evidence relating to the accuracy and 
rationality of analysts' earnings forecasts. 
Chapters 6 presents the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical 
study, and the experimental design. 
Chapter 7 presents the results ai).d discusses them in the light of 
other empirical studies. Shortcomings of the empirical study and 
suggested further research are then presented. 
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Introduction 
INTRODUCTION. 
OBJECTIVE. 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the part played by 
analysts in incorporating information about earnings into stock-prices. 
This is addressed in two ways. First, a review of the relevant 
literature is presented. Secondly, a sample of earnings forecasts from 
a major braking firm is analysed to identify the properties of the 
forecasts in the months prior to firms' annual announcements. 
OVERVIEW. 
This study begins by presenting evidence of the role of accounting 
earnings in bringing information to capital markets. 
with the theoretical background. 
Chapter 1 deals 
Chapter 2 presents the empirical evidence that accounting earnings 
have information value to the market, and that much of the information 
in a forthcoming announcement is anticipated by the market. 
Chapter 3 presents evidence that information is impounded into stock-
prices through the buy/sell decisions of investors. The chapter also 
indicates that information contained in analysts' earnings forecasts is 
incorporated into stock-prices; this may account for the market's 
anticipation of information contained in forthcoming announcements. On 
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the assumption that this is correct, studying the time-profile of 
analysts' earnings forecasts gives an insight into the impounding 
proces:3, which is usually only observed indirectly through stock-prices. 
Chapter 4 presents statistical methods for measuring forecast 
accuracy, and the properties of the forecast distribution. It describes 
how the impounding process may be investigated by constructing a time 
profile of analysts' forecast errors. Also, by constructing a time 
profile of the mean and variance of the forecast distribution, the 
chapter describes how the rationality of analysts' forecasts may be 
investigated. 
Chapter 5 reviews the empirical evidence relating to the accuracy and 
rationality of analysts' earnings forecasts, and the time profile of 
these forecasts. 
Chapter 6 presents the background to the empirical study in this 
thesis. It describes the data and error metric used in the study, 
presents the hypotheses to be tested in the study, and describes the 
experimental design of the study. 
Chapter 7 presents the results and discusses the findings in the light 
of other empirical studies. The conclusions of the empirical study are 
then presented. A final section provides some shortcomings of the study 
and suggests further research. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTING EARNINGS IN ASSET VALUATION: A BRIEF REVIEW. 
OBJECTIVE. 
The objective of this chapter is to document a theoretical link between 
accounting earnings and asset values. In particular, it suggests that 
accounting earnings may provide information to the market about future 
net cash-flows-to-shareholders. This chapter also shows how, assuming 
market efficiency, this hypothesis may be investigated empirically. 
Chapter sections. 
The theory of asset valuation. 
The relationship between accounting earnings, asset prices and 
expected net future cash-flows-to-shareholders. 
How asset prices reflect available information; the efficient markets! 
hypothesis. I 
ffftfftffffftfttfffffffffftftftfffffffftffffffttfffffftfffftffffffttfftt 
THE THEORY OF ASSET VALUATION. 
The value of a firm's future accounting earnings, as represented by net-
income or earnings-per-share <EPS), is of great interest to investors. 
Not only are accounting earnings a general measure of a firm's overall 
performance, but asset-valuation theory indicates that earnings may be 
- 11 -
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used by the financial community to value capital assets. Firms, or 
shares in firms, can be valued as the discounted value of the net cash-
flows for that asset upon which shareholders have a claim. The value is 
known as the present value or market value of an asset. Such a model of 
asset valuation is presented by Fisher <1961>. However, the Fisher 
model assumes perfect certainty about future net cash-flows, which 
rarely applies to the real world. Sharpe <1964) and Lintner <1965) 
extend the Fisher model to include uncertainty about future net-cash 
flows, and this work led to the development of the single-period 
capital asset pricing model <CAPM). The CAPM incorporates return 
uncertainty giving the expected return on an asset as a function of both 
the riskless rate of return <rf), and a risk-premium. 
= .. .. 1.1 
o-2 (r,..,) 
Where ri = rate of return on the asset i. 
rf = the riskless rate of return. 
r,, = return on the market portfolio of assets [this is 
a portfolio of all the risky assets in the economy which are 
included in proportion to their market value in relation to 
the market value of all risky assets]. 
E< ) = expectations operator. 
cov = covariance. 
o- 2 = variance. 
As rf is the riskless rate of return, the other term in equation 1. 1 can 
be called the risk premium. This is a product of two elements: the 
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price-per-unit of risk. [ E<rm) - rf] • which is the same for all assetsj 
and the risk Measure (j3)j [cov <r1 1 rn.>lrr"" <r,,,)],. which varies across 
assets. 
Fama and Miller <1972) present the CAPM as a valuation model providing a 
direct relationship between asset value and future net cash-flows. 
~~~~~~~~~-~=~l L 0':;;: <rm) j 
Vi,CI = ---------------------------------------------- .... 1. 2 
Where V1,o =present or market value of an asset at the beginning of 
time period t, <t = 0). 
E<C1,1) =expected net cash-flows at the end of time period t, 
<t = 1). 
The CAPM may also be applied to a multi-period world but the theory is 
complex and the single-period model is used to illustrate the link 
between the present value of an asset and expected net future cash-flows 
to the asset holder. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCOUNTING EARNINGS, ASSET PRICES AND EXPECTED 
NET FUTURE CASH-FLOWS-TO-SHAREHOLDERS. 
Although the CAPM provides a theoretical link between future net cash-
flows to share-hal ders (dividends) and the price of an asset, it does 
not directly provide a link between asset prices and accounting 
- 13 -
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earnings. Accounting earnings and cash-flows to firms tend to be 
positively related and because of this, accounting theory sometimes 
simply assumes that future dividends will be proportionally related to 
current earnings (i.e. to net cash-flows to firms). Ohlson <1983) 
describes this assumption as "a particularly severe deficiency .. " 
<p.141). However, Ohlson shows that with a certain set of restrictions, 
current earnings are indeed "an efficient estimator of future dividends" 
<p.154), and a later study by Easton (1985) finds a significant 
correlation between historical cost earnings-per-sh~re and the present 
value of future dividends. 
HOW ASSET PRICES REFLECT AVIALABLE INFORMATIONi THE EFFICIENT 
MARKETS HYPOTHESIS. 
The efficient markets hypothesis <EMH> provides an illustration of the 
link between accounting earnings and stock-prices. The release of new 
information concerning cash-flows to shareholders results in analysts 
competing with each other to trade on this information. As a result of 
the individual buy/sell decisions of analysts, stock-prices are bid 
up/down to their new equilibrium prices, which will fully reflect all 
available information. The EMH assumes that at any time, the present 
price of an asset fully reflects all available information and is an 
unbiased estimate of that stack's future value. 
Fama <1970) identifies three forms of tests of market efficiency, 
which differ in the definition of • available information': weak form 
tests, which define • available information' as past securities prices 
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and trading volumes; semi-strong form tests, which define 'available 
information' as all published information, and strong form tests, which 
define 'available information' as all information known by anyone. 
Evidence from Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll <1969), and Scholes <1969) 
supports the semi-strong form of the EMH, and Watts and Zimmerman <1986) 
state that "evidence is consistent with the semi -strong form of the 
[efficient markets] hypothesis and is generally accepted by researchers 
as descriptive." <p. 19) Early work by Jensen <1968 and 1969) does not 
find in favour of strong form market efficiency. 
In an efficient market, trading in an asset 1 on available 
information, an investor is expected to earn the market's expected rate 
of return for the given level of risk of asset i. Any return beyond 
this market risk-adjusted rate of return, is termed abnormal. If 
accounting earnings bring information concerning expected future net 
cash-flows to shareholders, then if the CAPM holds, a systematic 
relationship between the unexpected component of earnings announcements 
<the information of which will not have been incorporated into the pre-
announcement stock-price>, and abnormal returns on the securities of the 
firms concerned, may be expected. This provides the basis on which most 
investigations of the information content of earnings, are designed. 
Such studies require estimates of the market's expected earnings for a 
firm i, and the market's expected return on the security i. Earnings 
forecasts generated by models, or by analysts, are common estimates of 
expected earnings, and are described in greater detail in chapter 2. 
Abnormal returns may be estimated ~sing the market model. The market 
model is described by equation 1.3. 
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.... 1. 3 
Where ri t. = rate of return on asset i in period t. 
rmt. = rate of return on a market portfolio of assets in period t. 
CXi = model parameter. 
~i = return-risk measure for asset i. 
Eit. = abnormal return for asset i 1 with E(Eit.) = 0. 
The market model abnormal return is the return on an asset which is not 
explained by market movements, and therefore it is inferred that it is 
due to unexpected information about the individual asset. Therefore, if 
abnormal returns occur for firms with an unexpected element in the 
earnings announcement, it may be concluded that earnings bring 
information to the market, relating to future net cash-flows-to-
shareholders. 
Before presenting evidence for the information content of earnings, it 
should be noted that evidence for the EMH and CAPM, on which the above 
stock-market reaction study is based, is not entirely conclusive. 
Indeed, Lev and Ohlson (1982) state that "empirical accounting research 
has not been particularly supportive of either the .. [EMHl .. or the CAPM 
<p.284) ... [andl has indicated the need to be cautious, and conclusions 
can no longer be regarded as foregone <p.287>." 
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CHAPTER 2. 
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS; EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. 
OBJECTIVE. 
This chapter presents evidence which indicates that accounting earnings 
bring information to the market relating to future net cash-flows-to-
shareholders, as hypothesised in chapter 1. Si nee empirical studies 
require estimates of the market's expected earnings for a firm, and the 
expected rate of return on a security, this chapter also presents 
evidence on the suitability of different estimates of market 
expectations. It is concluded that analysts' earnings forecasts provide 
a superior estimation of the market's expected earnings, compared to 
time-series or cross-section models, but that the choice of model to 
estimate the market's expected return appears to be of little 
significance. 
Chapter sections. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between accounting earnings 
and stock-prices. 
Estimating the market's expected earnings. 
Estimating the market's expected return . 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCOUNTING 
EARNINGS AND STOCK-PRICES. 
Evidence of an association between the sign of unexpected earnings and 
the sign of abnormal returns is found by Ball and Brown (1968), and in 
studies by Foster <1977) and Watts <1978) which develop the Ball and 
Brown methodology. Summaries of these studies are given below. 
Ball and Brown <1968). 
The path-breaking work in the investigation of a link between accounting 
earnings and stock-prices is the study by Ball and Brown <1968). 
The study investigates monthly stock-returns in the twelve months 
preceding an annual earnings announcement and in the six months after 
the announcement. The market's expectation of earnings is estimated 
using a simple 'naive' model described by equation 2.1. 
. ... 2. 1 
Where .t.Z1 t. = predicted change in annual earnings for firm i, year t. 
a1 ;t., a:z, it· = estimated model parameters . 
.t.Mit. = change in average earnings of all firms in the 
market <except firm i) in year t. 
The unexpected earnings for a firm i in year t is estimated as the 
difference between the actual change in income in year t and the change 
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predicted by the model. From the:::;e estimates of unexpected earnings, 
all firm-year combinations are then divided into two sub-sets: one for 
those firm-years for which unexpected earnings are positive, and one for 
those firm-years for which unexpected earnings are negative. 
Estimates are then obtained for the abnormal returns on the stocks of 
these companies for the 18 months surrounding the earnings announcement 
in year t. Ball and Brown estimate abnormal returns-using a model based 
on the market model (see Ball and Brown, 1968. pp. 162-163). Monthly 
abnormal returns are estimated for each firm, starting from the twelfth 
month prior to the announcement through to the sixth month after (i.e. 
for months T = -11, ... 0 ... +6). For a firm i, ~i.o is the abnormal rate 
of return in the announcement month. The average abnormal returns for 
the Q firms in the two sets of firm-years, from month -11 to month T, 
are measured by the abnormal performance index <API>, described by 
equation 2.2. 
Q T 
APh = 1/Q E IT <1 + ~qt,) where T = -11, .. 0 .. ,+6 .... 2.2 
qcm'l t.am·--1 'I 
It is found that for the positive unexpected earnings sub-set, the API 
increases steadily from 1.00 at the beginning of the period <T = -11), 
to 1. 05 for the month of the announcement <T = 0). For the negative 
unexpected earnings sub-set, the API declines steadily from 1.00 at time 
T = -11, to 0.89 for the announcement month <T=O). These results 
indicate that accounting earnings bring information concerning future 
net cash-flows-to-shareholders, and that the market anticipates much of 
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this information. Indeed, the change in the API from month -1 to month 
0 <the announcement month> indicates that only about 10-15% of the 
potential information that the earnings announcement contains is new to 
the market in the month of the announcement. 
Later studies develop the Ball and Brown <1968) methodology. Watts 
<1975) finds that the quarterly earnings process may follow an 
autoregressive process which may be estimated using Box and Jenkins 
<1970) methodology. This may provide a superior estimate of the 
market's expected earnings. Also, the use of quarterly data may provide 
a less 'contaminated' estimate of the proportion of information in 
earnings announcements that is new to the market. This is because the 
Ball and Brown <1968) study estimates the proportion of new information 
in annual announcements. But new information brought by interim 
announcements earlier in the fiscal year may have already been 
incorporated prior to the annual announcement, thus reducing the 
estimate of the proportion of information in announcements that is new. 
Both Foster <1977) and Watts (1978) use Box-Jenkins models to estimate 
the market's expected quarterly earnings. 
Foster ( 1977) . 
Foster uses an autoregressive model to provide estimates of the market's 
expectation of quarterly earnings, and finds a systematic relationship 
between the sign of unexpected earnings and abnormal returns. 
- 20 -
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Foster uses past quarterly earnings data from each firm, and Box-
Jenkins methodology, to estimate the first-order autoregressive 
expectations model described by equation 2.3. 
. ... 2. 3 
Where zit. = estimated value for the expected quarterly earnings of 
firm i for period t 
~ = autoregressive parameter 
o = drift term 
From the above model's estimates, firm-quarter observations are then 
divided into a group for firm-quarters with positive unexpected 
earnings, and a group for firm-quarters with negative unexpected 
earnings. Far each security, Faster obtains daily abnormal returns for 
the 60 trading days up to, and including, the day that the quarterly 
earnings are announced <i.e. from t = -59 to t = 0). The abnormal 
performance measure used by Foster, which is a similar measure to Ball 
and Brown's API, is the cumulative abnormal return <CAR>. <A 
description of the abnormal returns estimation method used by Faster, 
and the CAR, is given by Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p.50). 
Foster finds that the CAR over the 60 trading days, for the group of 
firm-quarters with positive unexpected earnings, is positive <+2 %) , 
while for the group of firm-quarters with negative unexpected earnings, 
the CAR is negative (-3 %), supporting the hypothesis of a link between 
accounting earnings and stock-prices. However, Foster estimates that 
the proportion of information in earnings announcements that is new to 
the market, is about 32%, indicating greater informativeness compared to 
- 21 -
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the findings of Ball and Brown <1968). Using the X2 test, Foster then 
tests the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between the sign 
of the unexpected earnings, and the sign of the abnormal rate of return. 
It is found that the null-hypothesis can be rejected at any reasonable 
level of probability. 
Watts <1978). 
Watts <1978)(p.134) criticises the use of the x2 test by Foster <1977), 
used to test <and subsequently reject) the null-hypothesis of no 
relationship between the sign of the unexpected earnings (i.e. the 
forecast error) and abnormal returns for the given firm-quarter. An 
assumption of the X2 test is that there is no cross-sectional dependence 
between the variables Cone of which is the earnings forecast error). 
However, studies such as that by Brown and Ball <1967) have shown that 
earnings do show cross-sectional dependency. 
This paper investigates the link between quarterly unexpected earnings 
and abnormal returns in the quarters surrounding the quarterly 
announcement, taking the above criticism, and others made by Ball 
<1978), into account. However, Watts still concludes in favour of the 
information content of earnings. 
Watts uses three Box-Jenkins models to estimate expected earnings, one 
of which is the Foster (1977) model described above. <see equation 2.3). 
The second model used by Watts is a model used in studies by Watts 
(1975) and Griffin (1977) to model the quarterly earnings process . 
. . . . 2. 4 
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Where E<Zd = expected earnings for quarter t. 
Zt-1 = actual earnings for quarter t-1. 
a = moving-average parameter. 
~ = seasonal moving-average parameter. 
o = a constant. 
at = serially uncorrelated error term for period t. 
The third model is one estimated by Brown and Rozeff <1979), a study 
which also models the quarterly earnings process. 
. ... 2. 5 
Where ~ = an autoregressive parameter. 
Dividing firm-quarters into "positive" and "negative" unexpected 
earnings sub-sets, for each of the three earnings expectation models, 
Watts estimates abnormal quarterly returns using an adaptation of the 
Black and Scholes (1973) paired sample design <see Watts p.130). 
Abnormal returns are calculated for the quarters q <q·= -1,0, .. 5), where 
q = 0 is the quarter ending at the end of the week of announcement. 
Watts then constructs a t-statistic to test the null-hypothesis that 
there are no abnormal returns in quarter q < q = -1, ... 5). The tests 
are carried out for each of the "positive"/"negative" unexpected 
earnings groups of firm-quarter observations created using the three 
earnings models described earlier. 
For all three of the expectations models the null-hypothesis of no 
abnormal returns is rejected for the quarters q = -1, 0 and 1. The 
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strongest rejection of the null-hypothesis is for the quarter 0 <the 
announcement quarter) providing evidence in support of there being a 
link between accounting earnings and stock-prices as indicated by Ball 
and Brown <1968) and Foster <1977). The null hypothesis is also 
rejected, less strongly, for the quarters -1 and 1, possibly indicating 
'leakage' of information to the market prior to the announcement, and 
market inefficiency, respectively. 
The results are in agreement with the findings of Ball and Brown <1968) 
and Foster <1977) which indicate that the unexpected component of 
accounting earnings may bring new information to the market about future 
net cash-flows-to-shareholders. 
The power of tests used in the above studies may be greatly influenced 
by the estimates of the market's expectation of earnings and the 
market's expected return on a security. The following two sections 
provide evidence that analysts' earnings forecasts are a superior 
estimate for market's expected earnings, than mechanical model 
forecasts; and that simple expected returns models may provide 
estimates of abnormal returns that are at least as goGd as those derived 
from more complex expected returns models. Evidence on estimating the 
markets's expected earnings, and expected return, is presented below. 
- 24 -
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ESTIMATING THE MARKET'S EXPECTED EARNINGS. 
Brown and Rozeff <1978) state that "If market earnings expectations are 
rational, it follows that the best available earnings forecasts should 
be used to measure market earnings expectations." <p.13). 
If accounting earnings bring information to the market, the earnings 
expectation model/source which produces forecast errors <i.e. estimates 
of unexpected earnings) which are the most strongly related to the 
corresponding abnormal returns, may be considered to be the better 
estimate of the market's expectation of earnings. 
studies are presented below. 
Fried and Giyoly <1982). 
The results of 
This study compares annual unexpected earnings estimates <i.e. forecast 
errors) from two models <a time-series model, 2.6, and an index model, 
2.7), and from analysts <the "Earnings Forecaster"). 
Where E<Z~) = expected annual earnings for year t. 
z~-1 = actual earnings for year t. 
. ... 2.6 
c~ = drift term equal to the arithmetic past growth in EPS . 
. . . . 2. 7 
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Where G'tt. and $h. = regression coefficients. 
Zmt = change in the market index of earnings, represented by 
the Standard and Poor 500. 
Fried and Givoly (1982) find that abnormal returns are more strongly 
correlated with the analysts' forecast errors than with the errors 
generated by either of the models. 
Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and Zmijewsky <1987). 
This study finds similar results to Fried and Givoly <1982), providing 
further evidence for the superiority of analysts' forecasts as a measure 
of market· expectation of earnings. 
However, the conclusions of Fried and Givoly <1982) and Brown, et al. 
(1987) are not supported by the findings of O'Brien <1988). 
0' Brien <1988). 
0' Brien obtains annual earnings forecasts at four different forecast 
horizons; 240, 180, 120 and 60 days. The market's expected earnings 
are represented by three different analyst forecasts (the most recent 
analyst forecast available at the given horizon, and the mean and median 
of analysts' forecasts available at the given horizon) and by forecasts 
generated using the Foster <1977) model <see equation 2.3 above). 
0' Brien then estimates the cumulated abnormal returns, starting from 
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each forecast horizon date to the annual announcement date <see O'Brien 
p. 62). For each of the four forecast horizons, the Foster <1977) model 
generates forecast errors that are more strongly related to cumulative 
abnormal returns than the forecast errors generated by the three sets of 
analysts' forecasts. O'Brien admits that this finding "is inconsistent 
with previous research, and is anomalous given analysts' greater 
accuracy." <p.53) 
A possible explanation for the 0' Brien 
because different investors give different 
<1988) findings 
weightings to 
is that, 
different 
analysts' forecasts <and these different expectations are incorporated 
into stock-prices through 'dollar votes'), a simple generating model 
such as a Box-Jenkins model may better represent the market's overall 
expectation than the specific forecasts of individual analysts. 
However, this explanation would suggest that the mean or median analyst 
forecast should be more strongly related to abnormal returns than the 
most current forecast (an individual analyst's forecast). O'Brien does 
not find this to be the case. 
Although not entirely conclusive, the above evidence strongly points to 
analysts' earnings forecasts providing superior estimates of the 
market's expected earnings. 
ESTIMATING THE MARKET'S EXPECTED RETURN. 
Stock-price reaction studies require methods for estimating abnormal 
returns. The ability of models to identify abnormal returns may greatly 
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affect the power of tests used in such studies. Brown and Warner <1980) 
investigate how well abnormal performance can be identified by different 
expected returns models. 
Brown and Warner <1980). 
The study finds that simple expected returns models may provide 
estimates of the market's expected return that are at least as good as 
those derived from more complex models. The study collects observed 
stock-returns of randomly selected securities. On average it would be 
expected that the returns would not display abnormal performance 
<efficient market theory suggests that the abnormal returns will, over 
all time periods, average to zero). Artificial abnormal returns are 
then introduced into the data. The value of the abnormal return on a 
security depends on the expectation model used for generating the 
expected rate of return. Brown and Warner compare three models; 
(1) The Mean Adjusted Returns model. This model assumes that the 
expected return on a security for timet will be a constant <K), but 
this constant varies across securities so the expected return on 
security i is given by; 
.... 2. 8 
The abnormal return < ei, t. ) is given by the difference between the 
expected rate of return and the observed rate ( R;,~ >; 
.... 2.9 
(2) Market Adjusted Returns model:- This assumes expected returns for 
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period t are equal across securities but are not necessarily constant 
for a particular security. The market portfolio (M) is a linear 
combination of all risky assets, hence, for any security i, 
.... 2.10 
The abnormal return in period t is the difference between the return on 
the asset i and that on the market portfolioi 
.... 2.11 
(3) Market and Risk Adjusted Returns model:- This assumes that expected 
returns are generated by a model similar to the Black (1972) 2-parameter 
CAPM. 
E<R~~) = E<Rz~> + jli[E<Rm~> - E<Rz~>l = K~~ 
e 1 ~ = R 1 ~ - [ R:z: t. < 1 - jl i ) + jl 1 Rm t. l 
.... 2. 12 
.... 2. 13 
Where Rx~ = return on a minimum variance portfolio of risky assets which 
is uncorrelated with the market portfolio. 
Ordinary least squares regression is used to estimate model parameters. 
All models are consistent with the CAPM, given certain assumptions. 
However, if the CAPM is correct, the market and risk adjusted returns 
model may provide a superior estimate of the market's expected return, 
since it incorporates more information affecting realised returns. 
Brown and Warner test the null-hypothesis of no abnormal returns, for 
samples of randomly selected securities returns with abnormal returns 
of 0, 1 and 5 % artificially introduced. The three significance tests 
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used to test the null-hypothesis are the t-test, the Sign test and the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
Analysing the rate at which the null-hypothesis is rejected using each 
of the three expectation models, Brown and Warner <1980) conclude that 
the mean adjusted returns model performs just as well at identifying 
abnormal returns, if not better, than the more complicated models. 
Evidence presented in this chapter indicates that there is an 
association between the sign of unexpected earnings and abnormal 
returns. Assuming returns are generated by a model consistent with the 
CAPM, it may be concluded that accounting earnings contain information 
relating to future net cash-flows-to-shareholders. 
Studies by Ball and Brown (1968) and Foster (1977) indicate that 
although earnings announcements may bring some new information to the 
market, much of the announcement information is incorporated, or 
impounded, into stock-prices prior to the announcement. The finding 
that analysts' earnings forecasts appear to be superior estimates of 
market expectations indicates that the market may impound information 
contained in analysts' forecasts and, thus, anticipate information 
contained in forthcoming announcements. The next chapter investigates 
the process by which information may become impounded into stock-prices. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
THE PROCESS BY WHICH ACCOUNTING INFORMATION IS INCORPORATED INTO 
STOCK-PRICES. 
OBJECTIVE. 
This chapter investigates the process by which information is impounded 
into stock-prices. In an efficient market, information is instantly 
impounded into stock-prices through market forces, as individual traders 
buy and sell stocks in an attempt to profit from the information 
release. This chapter presents evidence of the impounding of 
information from earnings announcements into stock-prices. Evidence is 
then presented that information incorporated in analysts' earnings 
forecasts becomes impounded into stock-prices. Evidence for the 
differential information hypothesis, which relates to the influence of 
firm size on information production, is then presented, 
Chapter sections. 
Introduction. 
The process of impounding accounting information; empirical evidence. I 
I 
The impounding of information contained in analysts' earnings I 
forecasts; empirical evidence. 
The differential information hypothesis, with empirical evidence. 
Conclusion; the role of analysts' forecasts in studying the 
impounding process. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
If earnings bring information to the market concerning future net cash-
flows-to-shareholders then, once earnings are announced, traders with 
this knowledge have an incentive to sell shares in firms with earnings 
that are less than the market expectation and buy shares in firms with 
earnings that are greater than the market expectation. The earlier the 
purchase of the stock of a firm which has just announced earnings that 
are greater than expected, the larger the return that the trader will 
obtain from the share when it finally reaches its new equilibrium price. 
Conversely, it is important for traders to sell stocks in firms that 
have announced earnings that are less than expected, as quickly as 
possible. Eventually, through the individual buy/sell decisions of 
traders, the stocks will arrive at a new equilibrium price which, 
assuming market efficiency, will fully reflect all information contained 
in the earnings announcement. 
THE PROCESS OF IMPOUNDING ACCOUNTING INFORMATION; EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE, 
The process of impounding information into stock-prices is not directly 
observable, but may be studied by analysing changes in stock-prices, or 
traded volume of stocks, around the period of an earnings announcement. 
As information is impounded into stock-prices through market forces, the 
impounding process may be indicated by increased trading volumes and 
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price changes. The following evidence from Patell and Wolfson <1984>, 
Jennings and Starks <1985) and Woodruff and Senchack,Jr. <1988) 
indicates that information that may be contained in earnings 
announcements, is almost fully impounded within several hours of an 
announcement. 
Patell and Wolfson <1984). 
Patell and Wolfson <1984) find that much impounding occurs in the first 
thirty minutes after an announcement, and that the process is virtually 
completed within four hours of the announcement. They investigate the 
time period for which abnormal returns can be earned, after a positive 
unexpected earnings announcement, with quarterly and annual Value Line 
Investment Survey <i.e. analysts') forecasts used as the market 
expectation. They also investigate the number of "extreme" <Patel! and 
Wolfson, 1984, p. 237> price changes, around the time of announcement. 
Comparisons are made with 'control' group data randomly selected from 
non-announcement times. 
The results of the first part of the study indicate that while no 
abnormal returns occur 60 to 90 minutes before an earnings announcement, 
positive abnormal returns do occur in the thirty minutes after an 
announcement. There is also evidence of positive abnormal returns in 
the overnight period and in the first 30 minutes of the following day, 
possibly indicating the dissemination of the announced information to 
smaller investors. 
Patel! and Wolfson then investigate "extreme" price changes in 
discrete hourly periods around the announcement. The significance of 
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the number of extreme values for each period (from 10 hours before 
annoncement to 15 hours later) is then tested using the Z-test. 
Significant numbers of extreme price changes are found for periods 0 to 
4 (i.e. for the hour beginning at the time of announcement, to the hour 
beginning four hours after the announcement), and some activity is 
suggested for the hour preceding the announcement. 
Jennings and Starks (1985). 
This study suggests that the impounding process may last between seven 
and nine hours, with the length of time varying with the proportion of 
the unexpected earnings component. This is a similar study to Patel! 
and Wolfson <1984), but divides stacks into 'high information' 
announcements and 'low information' announcements, depending on the size 
of the unexpected component in the earnings announcement, with 'Value 
Line' and 'Earnings Forecaster' forecasts used as market expectations. 
Three different definitions of I high' and 'low' information 
announcements are used in the study (Jennings and Starks, 1985, p.343) 
but results are similar for all three definitions. 
Jennings and Starks investigate the number of "extreme" <Jennings and 
Starks, 1985, p.346) price changes aver discrete one-hour periods, from 
hour -3 relative to the announcement hour, to hour +10. Studying the 
significance of the numbers of 'extreme' price changes, it is concluded 
that the impounding process takes eight or nine hours (beginning 
between one or two hours prior to the announcement) for 'high' 
information stocks, and about seven hours <starting between the hour 
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prior to announcement and the second hour after announcement) for 'low' 
information stocks. 
Woodruff and Senchack.Jr. (1988). 
This study concludes that the impounding process may occur more quickly 
when unexpected earnings are positive. The study investigates 
differences in the speed of stock-price adjustment for 5 announcement 
groups, each representing different "degrees of surprise" in an earnings 
announcement, where degree of surprise (U) is given by, 
Actual earnings - Expected earnings 
u = ----------------------------------- .... 3. 1 
Expected earnings 
Expected earnings for each firm-quarter are estimated by analysts' 
forecasts from the "Value Line Investment Survey", also used by Patell 
and Wolfson <1984) and Jennings and Starks <1985). Firm-quarters are 
divided into different "earnings surprise" categories, depending on the 
value of U, these categories being "most favourable", "less favourable", 
"less unfavourable" and "most unfavourablen, where "favourable" 
<"unfavourable") refers to positive <negative) unexpected earnings. 
Using the stock-price at the end of the first trading day that follows 
the announcement day as the "fully adjusted" price, it is found that 
the percentages of the "fully adjusted" price change that have already 
occurred within thirty minutes of an earnings announcement for the most 
favourable and less favourable categories is 69% and 51%, respectively, 
while for both the less unfavourable and most unfavourable categories it 
is only 38%. Three hours after the announcement, most favourable and 
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less favourable stocks have achieved 91% and 76%, respectively, of 
their full adjusted price changes, while less unfavourable and most 
unfavourable stocks have both reached only two-thirds of their fully 
adjusted price change. 
The evidence above illustrates the process of incorporating information 
from earnings announcements, into stock-prices. In an efficient market, 
the impounding process is occuring all the time, as investors 
continually trade on information that becomes available. One of the 
main sources for accounting information, are analysts. In particular, 
analysts provide forecasts of firms' future earnings. If investors 
trade upon these forecasts, the information contained in the forecasts 
may become incorporated into stock-prices via the same impounding 
process that incorporates information from earnings annoucements. 
THE IMPOUNDING OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECASTS: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. 
Atrill and KcLaney <1987) state that "It has been claimed that stock-
brokers' 
original 
findings 
analysts are responsible for a significant proportion of the 
research carried out in the equity market and that their 
are communicated to and used by virtually all active 
institutional investors." <p.29) and cite Dimson and Karsh <1984) as the 
basis for this statement. 
Evidence from studies presented below indicates that changes in 
analysts' earnings forecasts mirror the changes in stock-prices, 
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implying that an impounding process is occuring. They show a positive 
association between the sign of cumulative abnormal returns in the 
twelve months preceding a forecast revision by analysts, and the sign of 
the forecast revision. The continued employment of analysts may suggest 
that they trade on their revised forecasts, prior to publishing the 
revision, hence abnormal returns are found prior to the revised-forecast 
publication. 
Finn (1981), Elton, Gruber and Gultekin <1981), Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya 
(1982). 
Finn finds that "both the direction and magnitude of the forecast 
[revisions] were positively related to excess return behaviour over the 
12 month period up to [the] month [of the revision]." <p. 29). Elton, 
Gruber and Gultekin <1981) and Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya <1982) also find 
abnormal returns in the months preceding a forecast revision, of the 
same sign as the revision. 
Brown, Foster and Noreen <1985) 
Brown, Foster and Noreen <1985) find that there is a positive 
association between the sign of a revision in analysts' consensus one-
year-ahead forecasts, represented by the mean and median forecasts, and 
the sign of average cumulative abnormal returns over the twelve months 
preceding the revision. Brown, et al. present five possible 
explanations for why abnormal returns may precede a forecast revision. 
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(1) Security prices impound information not yet available to analysts 
through, for example, insider dealing by management. 
(2) Security analysts are less efficient processors of publicly 
available information than the aggregate capital market. 
(3) Security analysts trade on their own information before releasing 
their revision to the market. 
(4) There are severe time lags between individual analyst revisions 
being made public and their inclusion in consensus forecast data bases. 
(5) Analysts use security price changes as signals to revise 
forecasts in the same direction. 
Option (3) may be a strong possibility as there may be little 
opportunity for an analyst to earn abnormal returns by trading after 
releasing a forecast revision to the market. Although the other options 
are also possibilities, as Brown, Foster and Noreen <1985) state; "It 
would be difficult to explain ... the continued employment of analysts to 
forecast earnings if all they are doing is re-expressing, in an earnings 
format, the information already available in a publicly observable datum 
such as a security price". <pp. 139-140). 
The evidence indicates that information reflected in analysts' 
earnings forecast revisions may become impounded into stock-prices. It 
is not known whether this process occurs as a result of the revision or 
prior to the revision. However, the continued employment of analysts 
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may indicate the former to be true. The impounding of analysts' 
information is discussed in the following section. 
THE DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION HYPOTHESIS, WITH EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. 
The differential information hypothesis <DIH), proposed by Atiase <1980) 
suggests that information production and dissemination by analysts is 
an increasing function of firm size. The possible reasons for this are 
presented in section 6.3 of chapter 6. Assuming analysts' information 
is impounded into stock-prices, and that the DIH is correct, then it may 
be that the allocation of a nation's capital resources to small firms 
is sub-optimal compared to resource allocation to large firms. 
The results of Atiase <1985), Bamber (1986) and Freeman <1987) support 
the DIH, and summaries of these studies are presented below. 
Investigations of the hypothesis are usually carried out by testing 
inferences of the hypothesis. This may be because the hypothesis deals 
with information production and dissemination, which are factors that 
may be difficult to directly observe. 
Atiase (1985>. 
Atiase finds that although return variances for larger firms do not 
change significantly during the announcement week, significant increases 
do occur in the return variances of smaller firms in the announcement 
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week. This suggests that the proportion of announcement information 
that is anticipated by the market, is greater for larger firms. 
Bamber (1986). 
This study finds that the increase in the trading volume of small firms' 
securities in the announcement week is greater than the increase in the 
trading volume for larger firms' securities. 
Freeman <1987) . 
This study finds that stock-prices for larger firms reflect announcement 
information at a greater forecast horizon <the timing hypothesis) and 
that for larger firms a greater proportion of announcement information 
is anticipated by the market, prior to the announcement <the magnitude 
hypothesis). 
The study divides firms into "large" (average market value $2.8 
billion) and "small" <average market value of $46 million), with the 
relevant values being derived from upper and lower quartiles for firms 
from the COMPUSTAT tapes. Two inferences of the DIH are investigated. 
The timing hypothesis: The abnormal security returns related to 
accounting earnings occur (begin and end) earlier for large firms than 
for small firms. 
The magnitude hypothesis: The magnitude of those abnormal returns is 
inversely related to firm size. 
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Using several statistical tests <including Wilcoxon sign rank test, 
matched pair t-test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) Freeman concludes 
that the null-hypotheses of the timing and magnitude hypotheses, should 
be rejected. 
Freeman <1987) finds that "pooled abnormal returns of large 
firms ... begin to reflect earnings changes 22 months before fiscal year 
end ... (but) .... the abnormal returns for small firms ... is detected 3 
months later"<p. 195), providing evidence for the timing hypothesis. 
Freeman also finds that "cumulative abnormal returns of small firms 
ultimately exceeded the total for large firms by 44 %. "<p. 196), which 
may provide evidence for the magnitude hypothesis. 
As the timing and magnitude hypotheses are corollaries of the 
differential information hypothesis <DIH), Freeman's findings may 
provide evidence in support of the DIH. 
The above evidence on the DIH is consistent with the results that would 
be expected if analysts' information becomes impounded into stock-
prices, assuming information production to be an increasing function of 
firm size. 
CONCLUSION; THE ROLE OF ANALYSTS' FORECASTS IN STUDYING THE 
IMPOUNDING PROCESS. 
This chapter presents evidence for a relationship between analysts' 
earnings forecasts and stock-prices. Evidence that this association has 
a logical basis and is not merely a statistical phenomenon, is provided 
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by findings to be presented in chapter 5. The findings show that 
analysts' earnings forecasts are superior information sources compared 
to forecasts by either statistical models or firm management. 
Consequently, this result allows analysts' forecasts to be employed as a 
proxy for market expectations in the study of the process by which 
information is incorporated into stock-prices. Therefore, by studying 
the time profile of analysts' forecast errors, the impounding process 
may be investigated. 
However, if analysts' forecasts are to be studied, methods for their 
evaluation are required. The following chapter presents statistical 
methods which may be used to evaluate the forecasts. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
METHODS FOR EVALUATING ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECASTS. 
OBJECTIVE. 
Chapter 3 shows that information in analysts' earnings forecasts is 
impounded into stock-prices. As a result, the properties of analysts' 
earnings forecasts are of importance. 
forecasts are accuracy and rationality. 
Two important properties of 
The first section of this 
chapter presents methods for evaluating forecast accuracy. The second 
section presents methods for evaluating forecast rationality by 
investigating bias and variance of the forecast distribution. These 
methods may be used to identify a superior forecaster. The benefit for 
society of being able to identify a superior source of earnings 
forecasts is that all market participants can then use this source of 
information, and stocks can be valued accordingly. <For the possible 
limitations on the benefits of identifying a superior forecaster, see 
Figlewski, 1978). 
The third section of this chapter describes how changes in accuracy 
over time may illustrate the impounding process, and how changes in the 
forecast distribution over time may demonstrate forecast rationality. 
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Chapter sections. 
Evaluating forecast accuracy. 
Evaluating forecast rationality. 
I The time profile of analysts' forecasts. I 
I-------------------------------------------' 
EVALUATING FORECAST ACCURACY. 
Although an investor will prefer a more accurate earnings forecast to a 
less accurate one, in order to decide which measures of accuracy to use, 
it is necessary to discuss the loss of utility, or dis-utility, that the 
economic agent (i.e. the investor) experiences from an incorrect 
forecast. The loss concept measuring the disutility associated with a 
forecast error is presented below. 
The concept of loss is the concept of disutility, i.e. the opposite of 
utility. The term utility is often used in economics to refer to the 
satisfaction that an individual obtains from a certain good or 
combination of goods. The concept requires the following assumptions, 
known as axioms, to be made about the way people behave; 
(1) Individuals have the ability to rank different goods A and B. 
The axiom of completeness. 
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(2) Individuals display transitivity in their decision making. If they 
---prefer A to B, and B to C, then they must prefer A to C. 
The axiom of transitivity. 
<3> The individual aims to achieve the maximum possible utility value 
that can be achieved with the choices available. 
The axiom of selection. 
(4) The individual will prefer more of a good to less. 
The axiom of dominance. 
The measure of the individual's utility is the utility index <U> which 
is generated by a utility function which can be written in the general 
manner below. 
U = U <A, B, C> .... 4. 1 
This states that the utility index is a function of the amounts of the 
goods A, B and C. However, the concept of diminishing marginal utility 
means that the utility increase that accompanies each extra unit of a 
certain good <A>, diminishes. Hence, the utility function which shows 
utility as a function of the amount of good A is not a simple linear 
function and may be written as a quadratic equation i.e. 
.. .. 4.2 
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It follows that if the utility function is quadratic, then the measure 
of disutility, or the loss function, will also be of a quadratic type. 
Each extra unit of a good that is lost will result in larger and larger 
decreases in the utility index. An increasing marginal loss is 
associated with each extra unit of a good that is lost. 
The concept of utility/disutility may be applied to the policy maker 
of a business who has a desired value for two related variables. Assume 
these to be accounting earnings (Y) and advertising expenditure (X). 
It may be assumed that the true relationship is a simple one such 
that; 
Y = a + b X ( b ) 0 ) .... 4. 3 
where a represents an aggregate effect of all other factors. 
<the above equation would apply to a time-period t or an observation i 
but the subscripts t and i have been omitted for simplicity>. 
The policy maker has desired values for earnings and advertising 
expenditure of ~ and n, resectively. However, it may be that the two 
desired values are not consistent i.e. attainable simultaneously. 
It may be assumed that the decision maker will want to minimise a 
weighted sum of the squares of the differences between the desired and 
attainable values for the two variables. For this a loss function or 
disutili ty function is created with coefficients based on the policy 
maker's perferences. 
l<X,Y> = h ex- n> 2 + k <Y- ~) 2 ( h,k < 0 ) . ... 4. 4 
The above loss equation <4.4) has to be minimised subject to the 
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equation <4.3). This produces another loss function; 
l*(X) = k<~- a- bn) 2 - 2kb <~-a- bn><X- n) t (h t kb2 ) <X- n) 2 
.... 4.5 
The loss function above is minimised unconditionally with respect the 
controlled variable, advertising expenditure <X); 
k b 
= <p - a - b n) .... 4. 6 
The optimal decision <X0 ) is shown as a deviation from the desired value 
of n. The <minimum) value of the loss function associated with the 
optimal value of X0 is; 
h k 
l*(X0 ) = ----------- < p - a - b n ) 2 
h + k b2 
In order to minimise the loss function the policy maker selects 
the value for advertising expenditure so that the values of X 
..... 4. 7 
and Y are as close to their desired values as can be possible at the 
same time. 
If a has to be estimated the decision that is made will be optimal only 
if the estimated and true values of a are the same. 
<4.6) the loss associated with the forecast, A, is; 
k b 
X - rr = ---------- <~ - A - b n) 
h + k b2 
Using equation 
.... 4. 8 
If the forecast for a is not the same as the true value of a then the 
decision that will be taken by the policy maker will be sub-optimal and 
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will lead to a greater loss than that associated with the optimal value 
of X0 • The loss when the forecast and the true value are not the same 
<i.e. when A * a) is given by substituting the X of <4.8) into equation 
(4. 5) i 
h k 
loss when a * a = ---------- (~ - a - b rr) 2 + -------- (6 - a) 2 
h + k b2 h + k h 2 
The loss due to the incorrect forecast exceeds the loss associated with 
the optimal decision, which is given by <4.7), by; 
k2 b2 
l**<A - a) = ---------- <6 - a) 2 
h + k b2 
.... 4. 9 
The excess loss shown by (4.9) is the loss associated with the forecast 
or prediction error. It can be seen that, assuming a quadratic 
disutility function, the loss is proportional to the square of the 
error. 
The form of the loss function need not be quadratic as in the above 
example. An alternative is a linear loss function. Different error 
metrics correspond to different loss functions. However, Brown, Foster 
and Noreen <1985) state that "It is well recognized that we [i.e. 
accounting researchers] have limited knowledge of investor loss 
functions associated with the use of earnings forecasts .. "<p.120) and it 
is the case that no single error measure dominates all investigations 
into earnings forecast accuracy. 
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Methods for measuring the accuracy of an earnings forecast for a firm i, 
in time period t, are presented below. Both the error metrics presented 
are 'scaled'. This should allow comparison of the accuracy of forecasts 
relating to different firms. The error metrics are the absolute 
proportionate forecast error <APFE), corresponding to a linear loss 
function, and the squared proportionate forecast error <SPFE), 
corresponding to a quadratic loss function. 
This APFE is related to the forecast error in a linear manner and, 
therefore, corresponds to a linear loss function. It is used in studies 
by Basi, Carey and Twark (1976), Brown and Rozeff <1978), Ruland <1978) 
and Patz <1989). 
I F,t. - Att.l 
APFE,t = ----------
1 Ait-1 
.... 4.10 
Where APFEH. = absolute proportionate forecast error for firm i period t 
F,t = predicted earnings for firm i, period t. 
Att = actual earnings for firm i, period t. 
The SPFE is related to the squared forecast error, and therefore 
corresponds to a quadratic loss function, with greater weight being 
given to larger forecast errors. It is used by Basi, Carey and Twark 
<1976). 
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<F,t- Ait.) 2 
SPFE1t = ----------- .... 4. 11 
Definitions as for APFE. 
EVALUATING FORECAST RATIONALITY. 
One of the properties usually associated with rational forecasts is 
that expectations fully reflect all available information at the time 
the forecast is made. 
If X is a continuous random variable, the expected value is given byi 
E(X) = [X f <X)dX .... 4.12 
where a and b are the lower and upper limits, respectively, of the 
random variable. 
When the expectation of X for time t, made at a time t-1, is conditional 
upon the currently available information set I~-1, the conditional 
expectation of X is given byi 
E<X) = E[X~I It-11 = faXtf<Xtl It-,)dXt J t• .... 4.13 
The forecast error, E~, for a conditional expectation or forecast, is; 
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.... 4. 14 
The forecast error has two important properties; 
1. Since the forecast of Xt, made at t-1, is the conditional 
expectation of X, made at t-1, the conditional expectation of the 
forecast error is zero; 
E( € t.l It.--., l = E[ Xt I I t.-1 l - E[ Xt.l I t·-1 l = 0 .... 4.15 
2. Forecast errors should be uncorrelated with any available 
information, since, if this were not the case, forecasts could be 
improved by incorporating this correlation. Forecast errors should be 
unrelated to any information available at the time the forecast is made. 
This property is known as the orthogonality property and may be 
described thus; 
If an individual's subjective expectation, denoted t.-1X , 
t 
.... 4.16 
for a variable Xt., equals the conditional expectation for X, then the 
individual's expectation or forecast is rational. 
= E[ Xt.l It- 1 l .. .. 4.17 
t. 
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Sheffrin <1983) <pp. 18-19) discusses these and other tests for 
rationality in forecasts. However, two important properties of rational 
forecasts are that they are unbiased and efficient. Methods for 
measuring bias and efficiency are presented below. 
Strictly speaking, bias is a property of estimators Cthe formula or 
procedure by which estimates are calculated), rather than estimates. 
Most studies investigating bias, with regard to earnings forecasts, 
refer to bias as a property of forecasts. Terms such as 'forecast bias' 
are convenient and will be used throughout this thesis, but it should be 
remembered that bias is a property of estimators. An estimator is 
unbiased if the the difference between the expected value of the 
estimator and the true parameter value, is zero. 
Bias = E<A> - A = 0 . ... 4. 18 
Theil (1966) presents a method, described below, for measuring the 
contribution of bias to the forecast error. 
It may be assumed that a realised change CA1> consists of a systematic 
part, which is generated by some mechanical relationship, and an 
unsystematic part, which shows the net effect of random disturbances. 
Hence, if a forecaster has perfect knowledge of the systematic part of 
the generating process for earnings changes, the below regression will 
yield coefficients of values a = 0 and ~ = 1. 
- 52 -
Ch.4: Evaluating forecasts 
.... 4.19 
Where A1 = the ith realised change . 
Pi = the prediction of the ith change. 
a and ~ = regression coefficients. 
Ei = a disturbance, with E<Ei) = 0 for all i. 
The mean square error <MSE> is decomposed into three componenets. 
Mean Square 
Error 
= Bias t Regression t Disturbance 
Component Component Component 
Where P and A are the means. 
Bp and sA are the standard deviations. 
and r is the correlation of the predicted and realised changes. 
.... 4.20 
The bias, regression and disturbance components can be shown as a 
proportion of the MSE, producing the inequality coefficients UM, UR and 
U0 respectively. 
ijM t ijR t ijD = 1 
.... 4.21 
The proportion UM shows the percentage of the total MSE due to error in 
central tendancy (i.e. the bias of the forecast) and is called the bias 
proportion. 
<P - A) 2 
ijM = -------------- .... 4. 22 
1/n l: <Pi - Ai ) 2 
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The second proportion, UR, measures the proportion of the MSE due to the 
deviation of the coefficient ~ from the 'perfect prediction' value of 1. 
This is called the regression proportion. The disturbance proportion, 
U0 , shows the proportion of the MSE that is due to the variance of the 
regression disturbances. 
Efficient forecasts reflect all available information. One source of 
information available to a forecaster is the series of previous forecast 
errors. 
A forecast <Pt.+l) made at time t, summed with the eventual forecast 
error <Ut..,), is equal to the realisation <At..,). Hence; 
Ut.+l = At.., - At.., .... 4. 23 
The variance bounds test <see Shiller, 1981) far forecast efficiency is 
presented below. 
The forecast error should nat be correlated with the forecast, as this 
would imply that the forecasts could be improved. Hence, far an optimal 
forecast, 
.... 4. 24 
The variance of the sum of twa uncarrelated variables is the sum of the 
variances, then it can be written that, from 4.23, far an optimal 
forecast; 
.... 4.25 
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As variances only take values greater than or equal to zero, then one 
of the properties of an optimal forecast is that, 
var <At.+ 1 ) ~ var <At-+ 1 ) .... 4. 26 
The above inequality may be studied by comparing the variance of a 
series of forecasts with the variance of a series of the realisations. 
The variance of a set of forecasts or realisations of a variable x, 
denoted V<x>, is given by the equation below. 
l: (Xi - X) 2 
V<x) = ----------
n - 1 
Where Xi= ith observation <where i = 1,2, .. n) 
x =mean of observations Xi <where i = 1,2, .. n) 
.... 4. 27 
As a time-series of earnings may be non-stationary <which would mean 
that the mean value required for calculating the variance would not be 
constant) it may be better to use a series of earnings forecast changes 
and realised changes. 
THE TIME PROFILE OF ANALYSTS' FORECASTS. 
Using the methods described above for evaluating forecast accuracy and 
properties of the forecast distribution <bias and variance), it is 
possible to create a time profile of these properties, showing how they 
change over time. 
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Since chapter 3 indicates that information in analysts' earnings 
forecasts becomes incorporated into stock-prices, the time profile of 
analysts' forecast errors may provide an illustration of the impounding 
process for stock-prices. By investigating bias in the forecast 
distribution, and how the variance of the distribution changes over 
time, forecast rationality may be evaluated. 
Empirical evidence relating to forecast accuracy and forecast 
rationality is presented in chapter 5. Evidence is presented on: the 
accuracy of analysts' earnings forecastsj the time profile of analysts' 
forecast errors <relating to the impounding process), and both forecast 
bias and the time profile of the variance of the forecast distribution 
<relating to forecast rationality>. 
- 56 -
Ch.5: Analysts' forecasts; the evidence 
CHAPTER 5. 
ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECASTS: A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. 
OBJECTIVE. 
This chapter presents empirical evidence relating to the properties of 
forecasts discussed in chapter 4. The first section of this chapter 
presents evidence on the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts 
compared to forecasts from management, or generated by statistical 
models. The second section presents evidence on the time profile of 
analysts' foreast errors (i.e. how accuracy changes over time), which 
may illustrate the impounding process. The third section presents 
evidence on bias in the forecast distribution of analysts' forecasts, 
and the time profile of the variance of this distribution, both of which 
relate to forecast rationality. 
Chapter sections. 
The accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. 
The time profile of analysts' forecast errors. 
The rationality of analysts' earnings forecasts . 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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THE ACCURACY OF ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECASTS. 
This section provides evidence that analysts' forecasts are superior 
information sources to forecasts from either mechanical models, or firm 
management. This may account for the findings presented in chapter 3, 
indicating that information in analysts' earnings forecasts becomes 
impounded into stock-prices. 
Although early studies by Cragg and Malkiel (1968) and Elton and Gruber 
<1972) find no superiority of analysts' earnings forecasts, over 
forecasts from naive models, evidence from later studies overwhelmingly 
supports the superior! ty of analysts over mechanical models. This 
evidence is presented below, from studies by Brown and Rozeff <1978) 1 
Collins and Hopwood (1980) and Fried and Givoly (1982). Evidence is 
also presented for the comparative accuracy of analysts' earnings 
forecasts and management forecasts. Although Basi, Carey and Twark 
<1976) 1 Imhoff 1 Jr. (1978) and Ruland <1978) find little difference in 
accuracy between the two sources, evidence from McNichols <1989) 
indicates that analysts' earnings forecasts may incorporate information 
not incorporated in management forecasts. 
Brown and Rozeff <1978). 
Brown and Rozeff suggest that analysts' forecasts should be superior to 
univariate time-series models because analysts can take non-earnings 
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infromation into account when generating an earnings forecast. 
findings support this hypothesis. 
Their 
The study compares forecasts of annual and quarterly earnings-per-
share generated by three models <a seasonal sub-martingale, a seasonal 
martingale, and a Box-Jenkins model) with analysts' forecasts, 
represented by the Value Line Investment Survey. Accuracy is measured 
using the absolute proportionate forecast error <equation 5.1). 
. ... 5. 1 
Where P1jt. = predicted earnings for firm i, using forecast source j, for 
quarter or year t. 
A1t = actual earnings for firm i in quarter or year t. 
For each year, or quarter, the absolute proportionate forecast errors 
from each of the four forecast sources, are compared pair-wise using the 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. The Wilcoxon test investigates if the 
median error difference of two forecast sources being compared, exceeds 
zero. For both annual and quarterly forecasts, analysts' outpredict 
all three models, with most differences being significant at 
probability levels of 0.05 or less. Brown and Rozeff <1978) conclude 
that: "·.quarterly and annual comparisons provide convincing evidence .. 
of Value Line's [i.e. analysts'] superiority over each of the three 
time-series models .. " <p. 11). 
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Collins and Hopwood <1980). 
This study provides evidence of the superiority of analysts' forecasts 
over model forecasts, comparing Value Line forecasts of quarterly 
earnings to forecasts generated by Box-Jenkins models. Averaging across 
all firms and years, they find that the mean absolute percentage error 
for the Value Line forecasts is 10%, while the mean absolute percentage 
error for the best Box-Jenkins model is 15%. 
Fried and Giygly (1982). 
Fried and Givoly <1982) compare analysts' annual earnings forecasts from 
the "Earnings Forecaster", with forecasts generated by a time-series 
model, and an index model <see equations 2. 6 and 2. 7 in chapter 2). 
Averaged across all firm-years, analysts outpredict both models, 
generating a mean percentage absolute error of 16. 4%, compared with 
19.3% for the time-series model and 20.3% for the index model. 
Partial correlation coefficients are then calculated between the two 
models' forecasts and actual earnings, given analysts' forecasts, and 
between analysts' forecasts and actual earnings, given the models' 
forecasts. While partial correlation coefficients for the time-series 
and cross-section models average -0.04 and 0.01, respectively, the 
average partial correlation coefficient between analysts' forecasts and 
actual earnings is 0.51. This suggests that analysts use a considerable 
amount of information not contained in time-series or cross-sectional 
properties of earnings. 
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Studies such as Brown and Rozeff (1978>, Collins and Hopwood <1980) and 
Fried and Givoly <1982) provide evidence for the superiority of 
analysts' forecasts over forecasts generated by models. However, it 
may be expected that of all earnings forecast sources, firms' managers 
would produce the most accurate forecasts, since they have access to 
'inside' information about firms which is unavailable to other 
forecasters. However, Basi, Carey and Twark <1976), Imhoff,Jr. (1978> 
and Ruland <1978) find no significant difference in forecast accuracy 
between analysts and management, and McNichols <1989) presents evidence 
for the superiority of analysts forecasts over management forecasts. 
These studies are presented below. 
Basi, Carey and Twark <1976). 
This study finds no significant difference in the accuracy of analysts' 
forecasts, compared to management forecasts. It compares the accuracy 
of management forecasts of annual earnings-per-share, collected from 
11 The Wall Street Journal", with analysts' forecasts from the 11 Earnings 
Forecaster... The forecasts have all been released during the forecast 
year, but where two or more forecasts are released, the earliest 
forecast is used. In order to be sure that analysts' forecasts have not 
been made with the benefit of any information contained in management 
forecasts, only analysts' forecasts obtained on the same day as the 
management forecast release, or earlier, are used. If there are several 
analyst forecasts, the mean forecast is used. Accuracy is compared 
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using the absolute, and squared, proportionate forecast errors <see 
equations 4.10 and 4.11 in chapter 4). 
Averaged over all firm-years, Basi, Carey .and Twark (1976) find that 
the mean absolute proportionate forecast error and the mean squared 
proportionate forecast error are all about 25% less for the management 
forecasts than for the analysts' forecasts. However, to determine if 
this difference is significant, Basi, et al. produce cumulative 
distributions of dollar absolute errors <I forecast - actual earnings!) 
and percentage absolute errors (!forecast - actual earningsl/lactual 
earnings!), for both management and analysts. To test if the cumulative 
distributions are significantly different, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
is used. Over all firm-years, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the 
difference between the distributions is not significant at the 
probability level 0.05. 
Imhoff. Jr. <1978). 
Imhoff,Jr. compares the accuracy of analysts' forecasts from the 
"Earnings Forecaster" with management forecasts from "The Wall Street 
Journal" and concludes that neither source exhibits significantly 
superior forecast accuracy. Only forecasts made at least eight months 
in advance of the year-end are included in this study. 
For both analysts' and management forecasts, the relative prediction 
error <RPE> is calculated; 
Actual Earnings - Forecast Earnings 
RPE = ----------------------------------- .... 5. 2 
Forecast Earnings 
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Across all firm-years, the mean RPE for management is 16.10%, and for 
analysts it is 16.68%. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov <K-S) test for 
examining the cumulative error distributions of the two forecast 
sources, no significant difference is found between the RPE and absolute 
RPE distributions of the two sources, at probability level 0. 05. The 
conclusion that management forecasts and analysts' forecasts are not 
significantly different gives support to the findings of Basi, Carey and 
Twark <1976) who arrive at the same conclusion. 
Ruland (1978). 
Ruland <1978) provides another comparison between management earnings 
forecasts, taken from the "Wall Street Journal", and analysts' 
forecasts, from the "Earnings Forecaster", and concludes in that there 
is no significant difference in accuracy. 
Ruland <p. 439-441) crtitcises the criteria of Basi et al. <1976) for 
the selection of analysts' forecasts. Basi et al. only use analyst 
forecasts published prior to, or on, the same day that the management 
forecasts are published, to prevent analysts from incorporating 
management forecasts into their own forecasts. As a result, analysts' 
forecasts are compared with management forecasts which had been made 
over a shorter forecast horizon. Ruland addresses this criticism by 
presenting results for analysts' forecasts published both before, and 
after, the publication of management forecasts. 
Another criticism by Ruland of the Basi et al. <1976) study is the 
study's conclusion that management forecasts, and, hence, analyst 
forecasts, are "relatively poor" <Basi et al. p.253). Ruland points to 
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the fact that as only two forecast sources are compared it is 
unreasonable to conclude that both are relatively poor sources for 
forecasts. Such a conclusion could only be arrived at if many forecast 
sources are compared. To address this criticizm, an extrapolative model 
<Ruland, p.444) is used to provide a third source of forecasts. 
The proportion of occasions when the respective forecast sources are 
the best, as defined by smallest absolute proportionate forecast error 
<see equation 4.10 in chapter 4), are calculated for when analyst 
forecasts are published before management forecast, and for when 
management forecasts are published before analysts'. The proportions 
are presented in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1: Relative accuracy of annual E.P.S. forecasts by analysts, 
management and an extrapolative model <with accuracy defined as the 
smallest absolute proportionate forecast error). 
Management Analysts Naive 
accuracy accuracy model 
best best best 
Analysts published 44 % 31 % 25 % 
before management. 
Management published 41 % 35 % 24 % 
before analysts. 
Source: Ruland, The Accuracy of Forecasts by Management and by 
Financial Analysts, The Accounting review <April 1978), <p. 444). 
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In order to find if the differences in forecast accuracy are 
significant, the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test is used. 
Testing the null-hypothesis of no difference between the expected and 
observed frequency of superior forecasts of one source over another, it 
is found that the difference between management and analyst forecasts is 
not significant at probability level 0. 05, either before or after the 
publishing of management forecasts. 
McNichols (1989). 
A recent study by McNichols <1989) suggests that analysts' forecasts may 
be a superior source of earnings information to management forecasts. 
Analysts' forecasts of earnings are collected at a time t = 0, prior 
to the publishing of management forecasts of earnings (time t = 1). 
Actual earnings are announced at a time t = 2. Firm-years are divided 
into a 'positive' portfolio, when the management earnings forecast is 
greater than the median analysts' forecast, and a '-negative' portfolio 
when the management earnings forecast is less than the median analysts' 
forecast. Between the times t=O and t=1 it is found that cumulative 
abnormal returns are positive for the 'positive' portfolio, and negative 
for the 'negative' portfolio. This may indicate that analysts have 
predicted, and traded upon, information that is eventually incorporated 
into management forecasts. 
Firm-years are then divided into another two portfolios: a 'positive' 
portfolio, when actual earnings are greater than the management 
forecast, and a 'negative' portfolio, when actual earnings are less than 
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the management forecast. It is found that, in the period upto the 
forecast announcement by management, cumulative abnormal returns are 
positive for- the 'positive' portfolio and negative for the 'negative' 
portfolio. This indicates that analysts may have, and be trading on, 
earnings information that management do not have. 
The above evidence suggests that analysts incorporate information into 
earnings forecasts, not incorporated by other forecast sources. This 
suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts provide a superior source of 
information for the market than alternative forecast sources, and this 
may explain the evidence from chapter 3 which indicates that information 
in analysts' earnings forecasts becomes incorporated into stock-prices. 
THE TIME-PROFILE OF ANALYSTS' FORECAST ERRORS. 
Evidence is presented below about changes in analysts' forecast errors 
over time, which may provide an illustration of the impounding process 
for stock-prices. Studies by Cooper and Taylor (1983), Cooper <1984), 
Brown, Foster and Noreen <1985), 0' Brien <1988) and Patz <1989), are 
presented below, and all find that accuracy improves over time. 
Cooper and Taylor (1983) and Cooper (1984). 
These two studies, with identical methodologies, both find that the 
accuracy of analysts' annual earnings forecasts improves noticably after 
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the publishing of interim earnings. The studies use mean analysts' 
forecasts, calculated from forecasts of several individual analysts, 
suggesting that "it is likely that .. [investors] .. would seek a range 
of [earnings] estimates rather than rely only on their own brokers for 
advice." <Cooper and Taylor, p.15). 
The accuracy measure used is the root mean square error, which is 
calculated from the sample of forecasts for each firm, for forecasts 
made before the interim announcement, and after. For a sample of n 
predictions <P) and realisations <A> the RMSE is given by equation 5.3. 
RMSE = ~1/n[<P - A>:2. .... 5.3 
Results for Cooper and Taylor indicate that across all firms, the 
average RMSE for forecasts made after the interim announcment is only 
about 60% of the average RMSE for forecasts made before the interim 
announcement. Similar results are found by Cooper. 
Brown, Faster and Noreen <1985). 
This study investigates the accuracy of consensus analysts' forecasts, 
defined as the median analyst's forecast, using the absolute forecast 
error <actual earnings - forecast) and the square of the forecast error, 
aggregated across all firm-years. The median value of these error 
metrics, at each monthly forecast horizon from month -22, relative to 
the announcement month, to month -1, are calculated. For both error 
metrics, there is an almost uninterrupted and noticable decrease over 
time. 
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0' Brien <1988). 
This study finds that analysts' earnings forecasts become more accurate 
over time, indicating that they incorporate new information. Analysts' 
forecasts of annual earnings-per-share are obtained for five forecast 
horizons: 240; 180; 120; 60, and 5 trading days. The study uses three 
measures of analysts' forecasts: the mean; the median, and the most 
recent of the analysts• forecasts, available at a given horizon. For 
all three measures, it is found that the absolute forecast error, 
averaged across all firm-years, declines as the forecast horizon gets 
shorter. 
Patz C 1989). 
This study also provids evidence of the improvement in analysts• 
forecast accuracy, over time. Patz compares the accuracy of 'short-
term' analysts' earnings forecasts, made at a forecast horizon of twelve 
months or less, with 'long-term' forecasts, made at a forecast horizon 
greater than twelve months. Using the relative prediction error <RPE> 
used by Imhoff, Jr. <1978) <see above), Patz finds that across all firm-
years, 65% of RPE's for short-term forecasts are within the range ±15%. 
However, for long-term forecasts, only 35% of RPE's are within the range 
±15%. 
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The findings suggest that information is incorporated into analysts' 
earnings forecasts, over time, and this process may illustrate the 
impounding process. 
THE RATIONALITY OF ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECASTS. 
The rational! ty of analysts' earnings forecasts may be evaluated by 
investigating the forecast, or forecast error, distribution. Evidence 
on forecast bias appears to differ between US and UK analysts. Evidence 
from the US generally suggests either unbiasedness or a tendency to 
overestimate earnings, while evidence from the UK, although mixed, 
points towards a tendency to underestimate earnings. Another property 
of rational analysts' forecasts is that the variance of the forecast 
distribution decreases over time as new information becomes available. 
Since the forecast distribution is unknown it must be estimated. This 
may done by obtaining a sample of earnings forecasts for a given firm, 
from different analysts. The distribution of analysts' forecasts at a 
given horizon, may also be estimated using a distribution of scaled 
forecast errors, for a sample of firms. Evidence presented below 
suggests that both forecast variance, and forecast error variation 
around zero, decline over time, consistent with efficient forecasts. 
Evidence is first presented on bias in analysts' earnings forecasts, and 
then on the decline in forecast variance over time. 
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Evidence presented below indicates a tendency for UK analysts to under-
estimate earnings, but conclusions of unbiasedness or a tendency to 
overestimate, for US analysts. 
Crichfield, Dyckman and Lakonishok <1978). 
This study concludes that US analysts' forecasts are unbiased. It uses 
US analysts' forecasts of annual earnings-per-share growth, obtained 
from the "Earnings Forecaster" over the ten year period 1967-1976, to 
estimate the below regression; 
Ai = 0: + J3Pi + € i .... 5. 4 
Where Ai = ith realised change 
Pi = ith predicted change 
o: and J3 = regression coefficients 
ti = disturbance <following usual assumptions) 
If forecasts are unbiased, the parameters o: and .13 are expected to have 
the va 1 ues 0 and 1 respective 1 y. Crichfield, Dyckman and Lakonishok 
<1978) conclude that o: and J3 are not significantly different from the 
hypothesised values of 0 and 1 respectively, indicating unbiasedness. 
Decomposing the mean square error using Theil partial inequality 
coefficients <see equation 4.20 in Chpater 4), the study concludes that 
bias only accounts for 18% of the mean square error. 
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Malkiel and Cragg (1980), and Givoly (1982). 
US studies by Malkiel and Cragg (1980), using five-year earnings growth 
predictions from several analysts, over the years 1961-1969, and Givoly 
(1982), using the forecasts of 70 analysts, predicting for 400 firms for 
the 11 years from 1969-1979, arrive at similar conclusions of 
unbiasedness for analysts' forecasts. 
0' Brien ( 1988) . 
This study investigates bias in US analysts' earnings forecasts, but 
concludes in favour of bias towards overestimation. 0' Brien suggests 
that forecast errors, aggregated cross-sectionally over a year t, could 
indicate bias in forecasts even if the forecasts are completely 
unbiased. This is because of time-period-specific influences. For 
example, an unanticipated economic event <i.e. an event which has not 
been anticipated by the analyst) which has a similar impact on the 
earnings of all firms in the year t, may result in forecast errors that 
are cross-sectionally correlated, which may appear to suggest that the 
forecast source is biased. 0' Brien constructs a t-statistic <D' Brien, 
pp. 63-64) to test for bias. 0' Brien claims that this t-statistic will 
eliminate forecast bias that is due to time-period-specific events and 
so is a measure of bias that is due to the forecast source. 
0' Brien finds that analysts' earnings forecasts tend to be 
significantly biased towards overestimation. However, although O'Brien 
<p.65) suggests that analysts may deliberately overestimate earnings to 
maintain good relations with firm management, 0' Brien suggests caution 
- 71 -
Ch.5: Analysts' forecasts; the evidence 
in drawing such a conclusion from these findings, 
bias, towards overestimation, is also found in 
since significant 
Box-Jenkins model 
forecasts, which 
management. 
are not influenced by concern for relations with 
De Bandt and Thaler <1990). 
This US study adopts a similar approach to Crichfield, Dyckman and 
Lakonishok <1978), regressing actual changes in earnings on predicted 
changes <see equation 5. 4 above>. It is found that the intercept term 
is negative and that the slope coefficient is less than one, indicating 
that analysts' forecasts tend to be biased towards overestimation. 
Bhaskar and Morris (1984). 
They investigate UK analysts' earnings forecasts and conclude that these 
forecasts tend to be biased towards underestimation. Using the relative 
forecast error <RFE> described below, 
RFE = <Forecast - Actual>/Forecast .... 5.5 
they test the null-hypothesis that the RFE distribution is normal, about 
a mean of zero, and reject it at the 99.9% confidence interval. They 
find that the distribution is negatively skewed, indicating a tendency 
for UK analysts to underestimate earnings. 
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Patz 0989). 
This UK study, investigating the proportion of overestimates-to-
underestimates for analysts' earnings forecasts, and the distribution of 
forecast errors, find a tendency to overestimate. However, Patz <1989) 
concludes that "the findings are .. consistent with a general inability 
to forecast a systematic factor affecting [ profi tsJ .. " <p. 271) and does 
not indicate that over a long time period there will be sizable 
systematic bias in analysts' earnings forecasts. 
D'Hanlon and Whiddett (19902. 
This study of UK analysts' earnings forecasts finds evidence of a 
tendency to underestimate earnings. Actual proportionate annual changes 
in earnings-per-share <AC), and forecast proportionate changes in EPS 
<FC) for forecasts made at a 7-month horizon, are calculated. The 
regression 5.6 is then estimated. 
AC = a + ~FC + U 'I' ,5.6 
Where a,~ = model parameters. 
U = random disturbance term following usual assumptions. 
Under rationality, a and ~ should be insignificantly different from the 
hypothesised values of 0 and 1, respectively. However, it is found that 
although the estimated value of j3 is insignificantly different from 1, 
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the estimate of a is positive, indicating a tendency to underestimate 
actual earnings changes. 
The above evidence, although 
underestimation for UK analysts, 
overestimation for US analysts. 
mixed, 
and a 
suggests 
possible 
bias 
bias 
towards 
towards 
Evidence supporting the reduction in the variance of the forecast 
distribution, over time, is presented below, from US studies by 
Crichfield, Dyckman and Lakonishok <1978), Elton, Gruber and Gultekin 
<1982), and Brown, Foster and Noreen <1985). Bhaskar and Morris <1984> 
find that forecast error variation around zero declines over time. 
These findings are consistent with rational forecasts. 
Crichfield, Dyckman and Lakonishpk <1978). 
This study concludes, referring to change in the spread of different 
analysts' forecasts, as the forecast horizon reduces, state that "while 
there is a tendency for the variation to decline, the decline [over 
months -13 to -1, relative to the announcement month] is uneven and 
often shows some increase in the middle month." <p.665). 
Elton, Gruber and Gultekin (1982) 
This paper finds that "while there is some decline in the average 
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dispersion as the estimates get closer to the end of the year, it is not 
uniform. Mast of the decrease in dispersion across analysts occurs in 
the first four months of the year." <p.18). 
Bhaskar and Morris <1984). 
This study finds evidence that the variation of forecast errors around 
zero, for a sample of firms, may decline aver time. 
This study examines the proportion of relative forecast errors, RFE, 
<see equation 5.5 in this chapter) falling within a range of ±10%, at 
different forecast horizons. It is found that for forecasts made 
between the 9-12 month forecast horizons, three-fifths of RFE' s are 
within this range. Far forecasts made at horizons less than 3 months, 
the proportion of RFE's within ±10% is four-fifths. 
Brown, Foster and Noreen (1985). 
This study, investigating mean standard deviations of analysts' 
forecasts over the months -20 to -1, relative to the announcement month, 
find a systematic decrease in the standard deviation over time. 
The evidence presented above suggests that analysts' earnings forecasts 
are superior sources of information to forecasts from models or firm 
management, and this may explain why the market may incorporate 
information from analysts' forecasts, into stock-prices. Changes in the 
accuracy of analysts' forecasts, over time, indicate that analysts do 
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incorporate new information into earnings forecasts. This time profile 
may illustrate the impounding process occuring in stock-prices. 
Although some US studies indicate unbiasedness, investigations of 
bias do not appear to provide strong support for the rationality of 
either US or UK analysts' forecasts. Evidence of declining forecast 
variance for analysts' earnings forecasts are consistent with raional 
forecasts. 
The following chapter introduces the hypotheses to be tested, and the 
experimental design, of the empirical study of this thesis, which 
investigates the impounding process and the rationality of analysts' 
forecasts through the time-profile of analysts' forecasts. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
THE DATA, NULL-HYPOTHESES AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN. 
OBJECTIVE. 
The aims of the empirical study in this thesis are: 
(a) to investigate the impounding process through the time profile of 
analysts' forecast errors; 
(b) to evaluate forecast rational! ty through the time profiles of the 
mean and variance of the forecast error distribution, and 
(c) to examine the size effect on these properties. 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. 
The first section provides a description of the data sample used for the 
empirical study in this thesis. 
The second section presents the error metric used in the empirical 
study, and the rationale for its choice. 
The third section presents hypotheses to be tested regarding: the time 
profile of analysts• forecast errors; the moments of the forecast error 
distribution, and the influence of firm-size on these properties. 
The fourth section describes the methodology employed to investigate the 
time-profile of analysts• earnings forecasts. 
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Chapter sections. 
The data. 
Selection of an error metric. 
Hypothesis testing. 
6. 1 Investigating the impounding process, using 
analysts' forecast errors. 
6.2 Investigating forecast rationality, using the 
moments of the forecast error distribution. 
6.3 The size effect. 
Experimental design. 
6.4 A brief overview of the experimental design. 
6.5 Investigating the impounding process. 
6.6 Investigating the rationality of analysts' 
forecasts. 
6.7 Investigating the size effect. 
6.8 Statistical testing of parameter significance . 
....................................•........ , .................•....... 
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THE DATA. 
The data sample, supplied by a well known large firm of stock-brokers, 
consists of forecasts of annual pre-tax profits made at monthly 
intervals, and the actual earnings, for 294 firm-year combinations 
<hereafter referred to simply as 'firms'). A list of these firms is 
provided in the appendix. Forecasts are made from month -23 through to 
month -1, relative to the announcement month, and announcements are for 
the years 1986-1989. For 174 firms, net-assets-per-share are also 
provided, and it is this measure which is used as the size variable. 
Although it may be argued that consensus earnings forecasts, from 
sources like IBES, may be less influenced by idividual ideosyncratic 
error than forecasts from a single stock-broking firm, it should be 
noted that consensus forecasts often include 'stale' forecasts. O'Brien 
(1988) finds that the most recent analyst forecast at a given forecast 
horizon, tends to be more accurate than consensus forecasts. Also, it 
is not known how stale forecasts included in sources like IBES actually 
are. If the impounding process is to be investigated through analysts' 
earnings forecasts, there is logic in using precisely time-dated 
forecasts from a large firm of stock-brokers. 
O'Brien also suggests that time-period-spececific influences may 
result in forecasts from an unbiased source appearing to display bias 
(see p.71 in chapter 5). However, since this sample includes 
announcements for four different years, this empirical study may avoid 
this problem. 
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SELECTION OF AN ERROR METRIC. 
The properties of forecasts may be investigated by analysing the 
forecast errors. The forecast error, FE,m~:., for a particular firm i, 
at forecast month m, for year t, may be defined simply as; 
.... 6. 1 
Where F,mt. = forecast earnings for firm i in year t, made at month m. 
A,t = actual earnings for firm i in year t. 
Hence, a positive forecast error indicates an over-estimation of 
earnings, and a negative forecast error indicates an under-estimation. 
The forecast error, FE, varies with the scale of earnings. However, if 
forecasts for different firms are to be investigated, a scale free error 
measure is needed. A scale free error metric will allow direct 
comparison of forecast accuracy between firms with large earnings 
numbers, and those with small earnings numbers. The distribution of 
scaled forecast errors for a sample of firms, at a given forecast 
horizon, may be regarded as having been drawn from a common 
distribution. The sealing factor chosen for this study is actual 
earnings (A). The error metric chosen for this study is, therefore, the 
proportionate forecast error <PFE), described below. 
F,mt.- A,~:. 
PFE,mt = ----------
A,t. 
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Where PFEimt = proportionate forecast error for firm i, at month m, 
forecasting earnings in year t. 
The PFE measure used in this study is exactly the same as that used by 
Basi, Carey and Twark (1976) and Brown and Rozeff <1978). 
Since the error metric <PFE> is scaled, the PFE distribution for a 
sample of firms, at a given forecast horizon, is used to estimate the 
the analyst forecast distribution. 
There are two main reasons for choosing this value as the scaling 
factor. Firstly, it will result in the forecast error being given as a 
proportion of actual earnings. The meaning of such a measure is readily 
understandable. 
Secondly, actual earnings provides a scaling factor which remains 
constant across the 23 months of forecasts for each firm. The use of 
the forecast as the deflator, as used by Imhoff, Jr. 0978), would 
result in the forecast error being scaled by a value that may vary over 
the 23 month forecast period, for each firm. 
A second reason for preferring actual earnings to forecast earnings, 
as the deflator, is given by Patz (1989) stating that "it is ... 
difficult to circumvent the Lorek <1979) argument that the use of 
forecasted earnings as a .. [deflator].. implies measurement of a firm's 
ability to achieve a predicted result, rather than a predictor's ability 
to forecast an outcome."<p.269 footnote 4). 
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HYPOTHESES TESTING. 
This section presents null-hypotheses to be tested, relating to the time 
profiles of forecast accuracy and the forecast error distribution, and 
the size-effect. 
5.1 Investigating the impounding process. using analysts' forecast 
errors. 
Evidence from chapter 5 suggests that the accuracy of analysts' earnings 
forecasts improves over time, and it is inferred that this illustrates 
the impounding process for stock-prices. The empirical study in this 
thesis seeks to investigate the impounding process by investigating 
changes in forecast accuracy, as defined by the absolute proportionate 
forecast error <absolute PFE), over time. If the time profile of 
analysts' forecast errors illustrates the impounding process, it is 
expected that forecast errors, on average, will decline over time. The 
null and alternative hypotheses are presented below. 
H<:,: There is no change, across all firms, in the average absolute PFE, 
over time. 
H.: There is change, across all firms, in the average absolute PFE, 
over time. 
- 82 -
Ch.6: Hypotheses and experimental design 
6.2 Investigating forecast rationality, using the moments of the 
forecast error distribution. 
Evidence on rationality from chapter 5 indicates that although there is 
evidence of unbiased earnings forecasts for US analysts, UK evidence 
suggests a tendency to underestimate. Evidence from chapter 5 also 
indicates that forecast variance, and forecast error variation around 
zero, decline over time, consistent with rationality. The study in this 
thesis investigates the first two moments of the proportionate forecast 
error <PFE) distribution. If forecasts are rational it is expected that 
the mean of the PFE distribution will be zero <indicating unbiasedness), 
and that the variance of the distribution will decline over time. Null 
and alternative hypotheses relating to changes in the PFE distribution 
over time, are presented below. 
Hr.:>: Forecast bias at a given forecast horizon, as measured by the mean 
of the PFE distribution, is zero. 
H·,: For·ecast bias at a given forecast horizon, as measured by the mean 
of the PFE distribution, is non-zero. 
He:,: There is no change in the variance of the PFE distribution, over 
time. 
H, There is change in the variance of the PFE distribution, over 
time. 
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6.3 The size effect. 
This section presents hypotheses relating to the firm size effect on the 
time profiles of both analysts' forecast errors and the first two 
moments of the forecast error distribution. The possible influence of 
firm size on information production and dissemination led Atiase (1980) 
to develop the differential information hypothesis. The hypothesis 
states that information production and dissemination are an increasing 
function of firm size. Evidence for the hypothesis, from Atiase 
<1985), Bamber (1986) and Freeman <1987), is presented in chapter 3. 
Freeman <1987) presents several factors that may result in analysts 
collecting and producing more information for larger firms. Trading 
profits from information, assuming the information is costless, will 
vary in strict proportion to market value. i.e. "knowledge that a 
large firm's common stock is 'mispriced' by one percent could be used to 
earn greater profits than information that would generate a one percent 
adjustment in the market value of a small firm's common equity." 
<Freeman, p. 196) 
However, in reality, because many large firms are complex 
conglomerates, the cost of information searches may be positively 
related to firm size. "If such complexities increase the cost of 
analysing financial data, marginal search costs increase as firm size 
increases ..... If marginal search costs increase with firm size, but at 
a lower rate than marginal trading profits, a large firm's securities 
are less likely to be mispriced than a small firm's." <Freeman, p. 197). 
If analysts collect and produce more information relating to firms with 
larger market values, it may be assumed that any extra costs of 
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collecting information for larger firms, are offset by the extra trading 
profits. 
Another important influence of firm size on the information searches 
undertaken by analysts, is presented by Freeman <p.198): "Grossman and 
Stiglitz <1976) note that trading by informed investors partially 
reveals private information and thereby limits the potential profits 
from knowledge that a particular security is mispriced. . .. The smaller 
the firm and the more thinly traded the stock, the easier the trading by 
informed investors is spotted; therefore, Atiase <1980) argues that 
[this fact] ... reduces the potential profit from small-firm information 
more severely than the profit from large-firm information." 
Evidence that analysts' production and dissemination of information 
may be an increasing function of firm size, is presented below. 
A summary of the Freeman <1987) paper is given in Chapter 3. Freeman 
finds that abnormal returns, relating to forthcoming announcement 
information, occur <beginJend> earlier for larger firms than for smaller 
firms. This is the timing hypothesis. It is also found that abnormal 
returns relating to an earnings announcement are larger for smaller 
firms than for larger firms. This is the magnitude hypothesis. 
These findings are consistent with analysts devoting more resources to 
the production and dissemination of information relating to larger 
firms. Further evidence of forthcoming-announcement information being 
impounded earlier in the stock-prices of larger firms, is provided by 
Collins, Kothari and Rayburn (1987). This study involves the regression 
of cumulative abnormal returns for the stock of a firm i, over a year t, 
on the percentage change in earnings-per-share in year ttl. This is 
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done for sets of firms divided into size quintiles, with size defined as 
market value. For the lowest market value quintile, containing the 
smallest firms, the adjusted R2 is only 0. 18. For the upper quintile, 
containing the largest firms, the R2 value is 0. 41. These results 
indicate that cumulative abnormal returns for year t explain variation 
in the percentage change in earnings for year ttl, to a much greater 
extent for larger firms. 
Collins, et al. then compare forecasts of earnings for year ttl, made 
by a share-price model <using cumulative abnormal returns for year t>, a 
random walk model <using earnings for year t > and a random walk-with-
drift model <using earnings from year t-5 to year t). The greatest 
superiority of the price model over the time-series models, is found for 
the upper quintile, containing the firms with the largest market values. 
The greatest superiority of the time-series models over the price model, 
is found for the lowest quintile, containing the firms with the smallest 
market values. 
Collins et al. conclude that "prices of smaller firms [in the current 
year] capture little information with respect to future earnings beyond 
that conveyed in the past time series of earnings. However, for the 
largest firms in our sample, there is rather clear evidence that price 
changes in the current year do provide information about next year's 
earnings changes beyond that contained in the time series of earnings. 11 
<p.l27) 
The above studies investigate information reflected in stock-prices, 
and conclusions about the influence of firm size on analysts' earnings 
forecasts are deduced by implication. Stickel <1989) studies analysts' 
earnings forecasts directly, investigating the influence of firm size on 
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analysts' revision activity around interim earnings announcements. 
Stickel hypothesises that the amount of earnings related information 
available through more timely media (e.g. Wall Street Journal) increases 
with firm size. "Thus, the relative informativeness of interim earnings 
announcements, vis-a-vis other firm-specific earnings-related 
information revealed at other times, should be less for larger firms." 
<p.279). Using both market value and trading volume of common stock as 
measures of firm size, Stickel finds that revision activity after an 
interim earnings announcement is negatively related to firm size. 
Stickel concludes that "This supports the hypothesis that earnings 
announcements are relatively less timely information sources for larger 
firms." <p.290). The findings suggest that analysts' earnings forecasts 
may already reflect a greater proportion of the information contained in 
interim earnings announcements for larger firms, relative to earnings 
forecasts for smaller firms. 
The evidence above indicates that analysts' earnings forecasts for 
larger firms may incorporate information earlier than forecasts for 
smaller firms. Hence, in the light of the above empirical evidence, it 
may be expected that at a given forecast horizon, the average absolute 
proportionate forecast error will be a decreasing function of firm 
size. The null and alternative of this hypothesis are presented below. 
Ho: The average absolute PFE, at a given forecast horizon, is not a 
function of firm size. 
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H1: The average absolute PFE, at a given forecast horizon, is a 
function of firm size. 
In the context of the investigation of the moments of the forecast error 
<PFE) distribution, in the light of the empirical evidence presented 
above, it may be expected that the variance of the PFE distribution, is 
a decreasing function of firm size. There is little theory relating to 
the influence of firm size on bias. The null and alternative to these 
hypotheses are presented below. 
Hr:• Forecast bias at a given forecast horizon, as measured by the 
mean of the PFE distribution, is zero for all firm sizes. 
H, Forecast bias at a given forecast horizon, as measured by the 
mean of the PFE distribution, is non-zero for all firm sizes. 
The variance of the PFE distribution, at a given forecast 
horizon, is not a function of firm size. 
The variance of the PFE distribution , at a given forecast 
horizon, is a function of firm size. 
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Null-hypotheses relating to the time profile of analysts' earnings 
forecasts, and the influence of the size effect on this time profile, 
are tested using the methodology presented below. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN. 
6.4 Brief over-view of the experimental design. 
The impounding process is to be investigated through the time profile of 
analysts' forecast errors <absolute PFE). The rationality of analysts' 
earnings forecasts is to be investigated through the time profiles of 
the mean and variance of the forecast error <PFE> distribution. 
profiles are investigated over three forecast periods. 
These 
(1) The Overall Forecast Period:- This includes forecasts for all 
forecast months from month -23, relative to the announcement month, to 
month -1. 
The overall forecast period is decomposed into two sub-periods, to allow 
a more detailed study of changes in the properties of analysts' 
forecasts, over time. 
<2> Forecast Period 1:- This covers the forecast months from month 
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-23, to month -12, inclusive. That is, all forecasts of actual earnings 
in year t, made after the earnings announcement for year t-2, but 
before, or in the month of, the earnings announcement for year t-1. 
(3) Forecast Period 2:- This covers the forecast months from month -11 
to month -1. That is, all forecasts of actual earnings for year t, made 
since the announcement of earnings for year t-1. 
<------------ Overall Forecast Period --------------------> 
<---- Forecast Period 1 -----> <-- Forecast Period 2 --> 
1------------------------------1 1--------------------------1 
-23 -12 -11 -1 
months prior 
to the announcement. 
The influence of firm size <see section 6.3) is investigated by 
creating sub-sets of larger and smaller firms. This partitioning 
employs net-assets-per-share, and is described in section 6.7 of this 
chapter. 
6.5 Investigating the impounding process. 
The impounding process is investigated through the time profile of 
analysts' forecast errors. The error metric used in this study to 
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measure accuracy is the absolute proportionate forecast error. The 
absolute PFE is calculated for each of the 23 forecast months, for all 
firms in the sample. 
In order to investigate how accuracy changes over time, a measure of 
time is needed. For this purpose a time-variable, T, is introduced. 
T takes discrete values for each of the forecast months. 
For the overall forecast period, T takes values from T = 0 to T = 22 
(from month -23 to month -1, relative to the announcement month). 
'For forecast period 1, the time-variable, T, takes values from T = 0 
through to T = 11 (month -23 to month -12, relative to the 
announcement) . 
For forecast period 2, the time-variable, T, takes values from T = 0 
through to 
announcement) . 
T = 10 <month -11 to month -1, relative to the 
Changes in forecast accuracy, over time, may then be investigated by 
regressing the absolute PFE on T. 
using ordinary least squares <OLS). 
The below regression is estimated 
for all i, m and t . .... 6. 3 
Where PFEimt. = proportionate forecast error for firm i, at month m, 
forecasting earnings in year t. 
T = time-variable. 
a and ~ = model parameters. 
U1mt- = random disturbance term following usual assumptions. 
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By setting the value of T at zero for forecasts at the beginning of each 
of the three forecast periods, the estimate of the intercept term a, 
provides an estimate of the average absolute PFE at the beginning of 
each forecast period. The estimate of the slope coefficient ~. 
indicates the average change in absolute PFE, over the forecast period. 
For the regression 6.3, adjusted R2 values are calculated. This value 
indicates the proportion of absolute PFE variation that is explained by 
the forecast horizon, as measured by T. 
6.6 Investigating the rationality of analysts' forecasts. 
This analysis is in two steps. Step 1 investigates changes in the mean 
of the PFE distribution, over time, and investigates forecast bias. 
Step 2 investigates changes in the variance of the PFE distribution, 
over time, and investigates efficiency. 
Step 1. 
Step 1 is concerned with investigating changes in the mean of the PFE 
distribution, over time. This is done by estimating the below 
regression using ordinary least squares <OLS); 
PFE1m~ = a + ~T + U1m~ for all i, m and t .... 6. 4 
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Definitions - as for regression 6.3. 
The estimate of the intercpt term ~. is an estimate of the average bias 
in analysts' forecasts, at the beginning of the forecast period. The 
estimate of ~ will indicate whether, on average, forecast bias changes 
over time. 
If analysts' earnings forecasts are rational, it is expected that the 
estimates of ~ and j3 will not be significantly different from zero. 
However, rationality will also lead to a decrease in the variance of the 
PFE distribution over time, resulting in a heteroscedastic disturbance 
term in eaquation 6. 4. The problem of heteroscedastici ty for OLS 
regression is illustrated below. 
For the following regression, written in matrix formj 
y = Xb + e 
where E<ee') = W 
the OLS estimator of b is; 
b = <X'X>- 1 X'y 
and the estimator of the variance-covariance matrix is; 
V<b) = <X'X>·-·'X'WX<X'X)···l 
If 
W = O'::;:I 
then 
V<b> = 0' 2 (X'X)- 1 
If 
W 1: O'::;:I 
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Although the estimator of b, equation 6. 7, remains a linear unbiased 
estimator, equation 6. 9 will provide a biased estimator of the true 
variance-covariance matrix in 6.8. 
White <1980) provides a method for estimating the matrix W, from 
equation 6.6, when W is non-scalar and unknown, which is used to 
generate a consistent estimator of V<b>. 
The <i,j)th element of the matrix W, Wij, is given by 
wij = E<eiej) 
Although vector e is unknowable, there is an estimator in the OLS 
residuals, e, given by 
e = Y - Xb 
Therefore, an obvious possible estimator for Wtj is 
= 
If errors are heteroscedastic, W is a diagonal matrix, and the White 
proposal amounts to estimating W by a matrix whose typical diagonal 
element is et 2 and whose off-diagonal elements are all zero. 
It may then be shown that, defining W by 
i-j 
otherwise 
generates a consistent estimator of V(b) through the use of equation 
6.8. Then 
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V(b) = <X'X)- 1 X'WX<X'X)" 1 
where 
V<b) -1 V(b) 
The diagonal elements of V(b) then provide estimators of the variances 
of the coefficient estimators which are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
Although the White procedure will provide consistent estimators of the 
standard errors, it should be noted that the OLS b estimators remain 
inefficient. The White procedure is not a solution to 
heteroscedasticity in the sense of providing a transformed equation with 
'white-noise' disturbances, but it is a useful tool for situations where 
model transformation may not be a sui table, and it does allow 
statistical inferences to be drawn. The use of 'White' standard errors 
to construct t-tests is described in section 6.8. 
Step 2. 
Step 2 is concerned with investigating changes in the variance of the 
PFE distribution, over time. As the forecast horizon gets shorter, and 
more information becomes available to analysts, it is expected that the 
variance of the PFE distribution around the mean, will decline over 
time. The change in the variance of the PFE distribution over time is 
investigated using the Glejser <1969) test for heteroscedastici ty. The 
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absolute values of the residuals from regression 6.4 are regressed on 
the variable T. 
I e:;.mt .. l = 't + oT + V,,,"t. for all i, m and t. . .. 6. 11 
Where eimt. = regression residual for firm i, forecast month m, 
announcement year t. 
't and 6' = regression parameters. 
V imt. = random disturbance term following the usual assumptions. 
The estimate of the intercept term 't, is a measure of the average 
variance of the PFE distribution at beginning of the forecast period. 
It should be noted that 't is not strictly the PFE variance, but is a 
measure of variation around the regression line. The estimate of the 
coefficient 6' indicates whether this variance around the regression 
line, changes over time. 
6.7 Investigating the size effect. 
Hypotheses which relate to the influence of firm size on the time 
profile of analysts' earnings forecasts are presented in section 6. 3. 
The size effect is investigated by carrying out the above experiments on 
size-segregated sets of firms, with net-assets-per-share as the size 
measure. Firms are divided in two ways; into 'below the median' and 
'above the median' firms, and into 'lower quartile', 'interquartile 
range' and 'upper quartile' firms. 
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6.8 Statistical testing of parameter significance. 
Since nothing is known about the properties of the earnings forecasts in 
the sample, parameter estimates may take either pasi ti ve or negative 
values and, therefore, a twa-tail t-test is carried aut, at a 
significance level of 0. 05, far all regressions. The t-statistic far 
each parameter estimate, is calculated by dividing the OLS estimate of 
the parameter by the 'White' standard error. 
Chapter 7 presents the results, discusses the findings, and suggests 
possible shortcomings of this empirical study and further research. 
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CHAPTER 7. 
THE RESULTS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY. 
OBJECTIVE. 
The objective of this chapter is: 
(i) to present the results of the empirical study; 
<i i) to discuss the findings in the 1 ight of evidence from other 
accounting studies, and 
(iii) to present shortcomings of the study and suggest further 
research. 
Chapter sections. 
Objective. 
The results tables 
Presentation of the results. 
7.1 Investigating the impounding process. 
7.2 Investigating the rationality of analysts' forecasts. 
7.3 The size effect. 
Discussion of the findings. 
Conclusion. 
Shortcomings of the study and further research. 
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THE RESULTS TABLES. 
The results are presented in Tables6.1 to 6.6 <each of which has two 
panels, A and B). Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 present regression results 
for the regression of the absolute proportionate forecast error <PFE), 
on the time variable T, for the overall forecast period, forecast period 
1 and forecast period 2, respectively. This regression investigates the 
time profile of analysts' forecast errors, an investigation that relates 
to the impounding process. 
Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 present two sets of regression results. One 
set corresponds to the regression of the PFE on T <investigating the 
time profile of the mean of the PFE distribution). The second set of 
results correspond to the regression of the absolute residuals of the 
PFE v. T regression, denoted lei, on T (investigating the time profile 
of the variance of the PFE distribution around the regression line). 
These regressions investigate forecast bias and efficiency, respecrwely, 
in order to evaluate forecast rationality. 
In constructing the lower quartile, medain and upper quartile 
boundaries, an extra constraint is added. This constraint is that all 
observations for a particular firm should be in the same firm-size 
group. As a result the numbers of firms in upper quartiles do differ 
slightly with the numbers of firms in lower quartiles. Also, 
observations for firms on the median/quartile boundaries, are 
eliminated. Hence, the sum of the number of firms in the different size 
sub-sets is less than the 174 'firms with size'. n. b. "Below/above the 
median firms" are referred to as simply 
respectively, for convenience. 
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TABLE 6.1: THE TIME PROFILE OF ANALYSIS' FORECAST ERRORS. 
Overall forecast period: 
PANEL A. 
All Firms 
(n = 294 x 
All Firms 
with size 
23) 
<n = 174 x 23) 
Small firms 
<n = 86 x 23) 
Large firms 
<n = 84 x 23) 
IPFEI =at ~T + U 
ex 
0.170f 
<4.1E-03) 
[3.2E-03J 
0.169t 
(5. 2E-03) 
[4.1E-03l 
0. 144t 
<5. 6E-03) 
[ 4. lE-031 
0.197f 
<8. 7E-03) 
[ 7. 2E-03l 
~ 
-6.3E-03t 
<2. 5E-04) 
[2.4E-04l 
-6.3E-03f 
<3. 2E-04) 
[ 3. 1E-04l 
-5.6E-03f 
<3. 5E-04 > 
[ 3. lE-041 
-7.2E-03f 
<5.4E-04) 
[ 5. 5E-04l 
-R2 
0.0970 
0.0990 
0.1540 
0.0853 
f denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0.05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of x 
in each sample firm-years 
number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented < x ). 
The DLS estimated standard error is presented [ x ]. 
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TABLE 6.1: THE TIME PROFILE OF ANALYSTS' FORECAST ERRORS. 
Overall forecast period: IPFEI =a+ ~T + U 
PANEL B. 
a ~ R2 
Lower quartile 0.156f -6.4E-03* 0.2054 
firms <7. 8E-03) <4.7E-04> 
<n = 44 X 23) [ 5. 7E-03] [4.2E-04] 
Interquartile range 0.156* -5.8E-03t 0.0984 
firms <6. 7E-03) <4. 1E-04) 
<n = 79 X 23) [5.4E-03] [4.1E-04] 
Upper quartile 0.205t -7.2E-03t 0.0758 
firms (0.013) <8. 5E-04) 
<n = 42 X 23) [0.011] [8.3E-04] 
• denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0.05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of 
in each sample firm-years 
X number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented < x ). 
The OLS estimated standard error is presented [ x ]. 
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TABLE 6.2: THE TI!E PROFILE OF ANALYSTS' FORECAST ERRORS. 
Forecast period 1: 
PANEL A. 
All Firms 
<n = 294 x 12) 
All Firms 
with size 
<n = 174 x 12) 
Small firms 
<n = 86 x 12) 
Large firms 
<n = 84 x 12) 
IPFEI =a+ ~T + U 
0.164f 
<6. 1E-03) 
[5.8E-03l 
0.160f 
<7. BE-03) 
[ 7. 3E-03J 
0.147t 
<8.7E-03> 
[ 7. 5E-03l 
0. 177f 
<0.013) 
[0.0121 
-5.2E-03f 
<8. 2E-04 > 
[8.6E-04l 
-4.6-03f 
<1. 1E-03> 
[ 1. 1E-03l 
-6.0E-03t 
<1.2E-03) 
[ 1. 1E-03l 
-3.3E-03f 
<1. BE-03) 
[ 1. 8E-03l 
-R:z 
0.0118 
0.0093 
o. 0311 
0.0025 
• denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0.05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of x 
in each sample firm-years 
number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented < x ). 
The OLS estimated standard error is presented [ x ]. 
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TABLE 6.2: THE TIME PROFILE OF ANALYSIS' FORECAST ERRORS. 
Forecast period 1: IPFEI =a+ ~I+ U 
PANEL B. 
-
a ~ R2 
Lower quartile 0.158t -6.6E-03t 0.0383 
firms (0.012) <1.6E-03) 
(n = 44 X 12) [0.011] [ 1. 6E-03l 
Interquartile range 0.149t -4.5E-03f 0.0095 
firms <9.5E-03> <1.4E-03> 
<n = 79 X 12) [ 9. 7E-03l ( 1. 4E-03l 
Upper quartile 0.176f -2.4E-03 -0.0005 
firms <0.021) <2. 8E-03) 
<n = 42 X 12) [0.018] [2.7E-03l 
f denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0.05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of 
in each sample firm-years 
X number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented ( x ). 
The OLS estimated standard error is presented [ x l. 
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TABLE 6.3: THE TIME PROFILE OF ANALYSTS' FORECAST ERRORS. 
Forecast period 2: 
PANEL A. 
All Firms 
<n = 294 x 11) 
All Firms 
with size 
<n = 174 x 11) 
Small firms 
<n = 86 x 11) 
Large firms 
<n = 84 x 11) 
IPFEI =a+ ~T + U 
0.094f 
<3.2E-03) 
[ 2. 6E-03l 
0.096f 
<4.3E-03) 
[3.6E-03l 
0.072f 
<3.8E-03) 
[ 3. 1E-03l 
0. 120f 
<7. 8E-03) 
[ 6. 4E-03J 
-6.6E-03t 
<4. 5E-04 > 
[4.4E-04l 
-7.0E-03t 
(6. OE-04) 
[ 6. OE-041 
-4.7E-03t 
<5.6E-04) 
[5.2E-04l 
-9.3E-03t 
<1. 1E-03) 
[ 1. 1E-03J 
0.0645 
0.0667 
0.0829 
0.0723 
f denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0.05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of x 
in each sample firm-years 
number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented ( x ), 
The OLS estimated standard error is presented [ x ] . 
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TABLE 6.3: THE TIME PROFILE OF ANALYSTS' FORECAST ERRORS~ 
Forecast period 2: IPFEI =a+ ~I+ U 
PANEL B. 
-
a j3 R:;, 
Lower quartile 0.07H -5. 1E-03t 0. 1195 
firms <5. 2E-03) <7.3E-04> 
<n = 44 X 11) [ 3. 8E-03J [6.4E-04J 
Interquartile range 0.082f -5.4E-03f 0.0603 
firms <4.7E-03) <7. OE-04 > 
<n = 79 X 11) [ 4. 1E-03J [6.9E-04J 
Upper quartile 0.148f -0.0131 0.0955 
firms <0.013) <1. BE-03 > 
<n = 42 X 11) [0.0111 [ 1. BE-031 
f denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0.05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of 
in each sample firm-years 
X number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented ( x ). 
The OLS estimated standard error is presented [ x J. 
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TABLE 6.4: THE TIME PROFILE OF FORECAST ERROR <PEE> DISTRIBUTION. 
Overall forecast period: 
PANEL A. 
All Firms 
<n = 294 x 23) 
All Firms 
with size 
<n = 174 X 23) 
PEE = a + ~T + U 
lei = '¥ + 6'1 + V 
(X 
-0.0501 1.8E-031 
<5.3E-03) <3.3E-04) 
[4.2E-03l l3.1E-04l 
-0. 064f 2.7E-03t 
<6.6E-03) <4.1E-04> 
[ 5. 3E-03l ( 4. OE-041 
(mean of PEE) . 
<variance of PEE>. 
0.1571 -5.8E-03t 
<4.2E-03) <2.6E-04) 
[3.3E-03l l2.5E-04l 
0.153f -5.6E-03f 
(5.2E-03) <3. 2E-04> 
l4.2E-03l l3.2E-04l 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Small firms -0.096f 4.0E-03t 0.1281 -4.9E-03f 
<n = 86 X 23) <7. 1E-03) <4.4E-04) <4. 8E-03> <3.0E-04) 
[5.2E-03l [3.9E-04l [3.6E-03l [ 2. 7E-04l 
Large firms -0.035f 1.5E-03f 0.186f -6.6E-03f 
<n = 84 X 23) (0. 011) <7. OE-04) (9. OE-03) <5. 5E-04) 
[9.3E-03l [ 7. OE-041 [ 7. 4E-03l l5.6E-04l 
t denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0.05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of 
in each sample firm-years 
X number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented < x ). 
The OLS estimated standard error is presented [ x l. 
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TABLE 6.4: THE TIXE PROFILE OE THE FORECAST ERROR CPFEL DISTRIBUTION. 
Overall forecast period: <mean of PFE). PFE = a + .In + U 
lei = '¥ + oT + v <variance of PFE>. 
PANEL B. 
(X 
.6 '¥ 0 
Lower quartile -0. 1191 5.0E-03f 0. 1351 -5.6E-031 
firms <9. 7E-03) <5. 9E-04> (5.9E-03> <3.6E-04) 
<n = 44 X 23) [ 7. OE-031 [ 5. 2E-04l [ 4. 4E-03l [ 3. 3E-04l 
Interquartile range -0.057f 2.3E-03t 0.1401 -5.2E-03t 
firms <8. 7E-03) <5.3E-04) (6. 'lE-03) <4.1E-04> 
<n = 79 X 23) [6.9E-031 [ 5. 3E-04l [5.5E-031 [ 4. 2E-04l 
Upper quartile -0.011 7. 1E-04 0.2021 -7.0E-03t 
firms (0.017) <1. 1E-03) (0.014) <8.5E-04) 
<n = 42 X 23) [0.014] [ 1. 1E-031 [0.0111 [8.4E-041 
* denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0.05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of 
in each sample firm-years 
X number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented < x ). 
The OLS estimated standard error is presented [ x ]. 
- 107-
Ch.7: Results and discussion 
TABLE 6.5: THE TIME PROFILE OF THE FORECAST ERROR <PFE> DISTRIBUTION. 
Forecast period 1: 
PAHEL A. 
All Firms 
<n = 294 x 12) 
All Firms 
with size 
<n = 174 X 12) 
PFE = o: + _tiT + U <mean of PFE>. 
lei = ~ + 6'T + V <variance of PFE). 
-0.053f 2.2E-03f 
(8.0E-03) <1.1E-03) 
[7.5E-03l [1.1E-03l 
-0.067f 2.9E-03f 
(0.010) <1. 4E-03) 
[ 9. 3E-03l [1.4E-03l 
0.151f -4.7E-03f 
<6.2E-03) C8.3E-04) 
[5.9E-03l [8.7E-04l 
0. 144f -4.1E-03f 
<7. 8E-03) C 1. 1E-03) 
[ 7. 4E-03J [ 1. 1E-03J 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Small firms -0.097f 3.7E-03* 0.133• -5.9E-03* 
<n = 86 X 12) (0. 011) C1.5E-03) <7. 4E-03) <9.8E-04) 
[9.5E-03l [ 1. 4E-03J [6.5E-03J [9.5E-04J 
Large firms -0. 04H 2.3E-03 0. 164f -2.7E-03 
<n = 84 X 12) (0.017) <2. 4E-03) (0.013) <1. 9E-03) 
[0.0161 [ 2. 4E-03J [ 0. 013] [ 1. 9E-03J 
* denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0. 05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of 
in each sample firm-years 
X number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented ( x ). 
The OLS estimated standard error is presented [ x J. 
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TABLE A.5; THE TIME PROFILE OF THE FORECAST ERROR <PFE> DISTRIBUTION. 
Forecast per-iod 1: 
PANEL B. 
Lmier quartile 
firms 
<n = 44 X 12) 
Interquartile range 
firms 
<n = 79 X 12) 
Upper quartile 
firms 
<n = 42 X 12) 
PFE = a + _6T + U 
lei = 't + oT + V 
(mean of PFE) . 
<variance of PFE). 
ex ~ 't 
-0.117f 4.2E-03f 0.140f 
(0.015) <2. OE-03) <9. 4E-03) 
[0.0131 [ 1. 9E-03l [ 8. 1E-03l 
-0.060f 2.7E-03 o. 137f 
(0.013) <1. 8E-03) <9. 5E-03) 
(0.0121 [ 1. 8E-03l [ 9. 9E-03l 
-0.019 1.4E-03 0.172• 
<0.027) <3.7E-03) (0. 021) 
[ 0. 024] [ 3. 6E-03J [ 0. 0191 
6' 
-6.3E-03f 
<1.3E-03) 
[ 1. 2E-03l 
-4.4E-03f 
<1. 4E-03) 
[ 1. 5E-03l 
-2.1E-03 
<2. 9E-03) 
[ 2. 7E-03l 
* denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0.05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of x 
in each sample firm-years 
number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented < x ). 
The OLS estimated standard error is presented [ x J. 
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TABLE 6.6: THE TIME PROFILE OF THE FORECAST ERROR <PFE) DISTRIBUTION, 
Forecast period 2: 
PANEL A. 
All Firms 
<n = 294 x 11> 
All Firms 
with size 
<n = 174 X 11> 
PFE = a + ~T + U 
lei = 't + 6'T + V 
<mean of PFE). 
<variance of PFE>. 
-0.017t -1.1E-04 
<4.2E-03) <5.8E-04) 
[3.4E-03l [5.6E-04l 
-0.019t 4.6E-04 
<5. 6E-03 > <7. 6E-04> 
[4,5E-03l ['7.5E-04l 
0.091t -6.6E-03t 
(3.3E-03) <4.5E-04) 
C2.6E-03l (4.5E-04l 
0.092t -6.9E-03t 
<4. 4E-03) <6. OE-04) 
[3.6E-03l [6.1E-04l 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Small firms -0.034-f 1.'7E-03t 0. 067t -4.5E-03t 
<n = 86 X 11) <5.1E-03) (7.3E-04> <3.5E-03> <5. 1E-04) 
[ 4 I 1E-03] [6.9E-04l (2.9E-03l [4.8E-04l 
Large firms -2.8E-03 -8.8E-04 0. 120f -9.6E-03t 
<n = 84 X 11) (0.010) <1.4E-03) <7.8E-03) <1. 1E-03) 
[8.1E-03l [ 1. 4E-03J [6.5E-03J [ 1. 1E-03J 
t denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0.05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of 
in each sample firm-years 
X number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented < x ). 
The OLS estimated standard error is presented ( x ], 
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TABLE 6.6: THE TIME PROFILE OF THE FORECAST ERROR <PFE) DISTRIBUTION, 
Forecast period 2: PFE = a + _13T + U <mean of PFE>. 
lei = ~ + 6'T + V (variance of PFE). 
PANEL B. 
ex J3 ~ 6' 
Lower quartile -0.048f 3.3E-03f 0.0621 -4.5E-03t 
firms (6. 6E-03) <9. 2E-04) <4.4E-03) <6.2E-04) 
<n = 44 X 11) [ 4. 9E-03l [ 8. 2E-04J [3.2E-03l [5.4E-04J 
Interquartile range -0.023f 1.2E-03 0.078f -5.2E-03f 
firms <6. 4E-03) <9. 1E-04) <4.8E-03) <7. 1E-04) 
(n = 79 X 11) ( 5 I 3E-03] [ 9. OE-041 [4.2E-03l [ 7 I OE-04] 
Upper quartile 0.027 -4.3E-03 0 I 154f -0. 014f 
firms (0.017) <2. 3E-03) (0.013) <1. 7E-03) 
<n = 42 X 11) (0.014] [2.3E-03l [0.011] [ 1. 8E-03J 
* denotes that a parameter estimate is significant at probability 0.05 
using a two-tail t-test. 
n = number of forecasts = number of 
in each sample firm-years 
X number of 
forecast months 
The 'White' estimated standard error is presented ( x ). 
The OLS estimated standard error is presented [ x ]. 
- 111-
Ch.7: Results and discussion 
PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS. 
7. 1 Investigating the impounding process. <The time profile of 
analysts' forecast errors). 
From Table 6. 1 <panel A> the parameter estimate of f3 for the overall 
forecast period indicates that, for the 'all firms' sample, the absolute 
PFE declines over time. The estimates of ~ for the 'all firms' sample 
for forecast period 1 <Table 6.2, panel A> and forecast period 2 <Table 
6. 3, panel A> indicate that the decline over the months -23 to -12 
<announcement month = 0) is similar to the decline over the months -11 
to -1. 
The results indicate a steady systematic improvement in forecast 
accuracy, and reduction in absolute PFE, over time, as shown by graph 
7' 1. 
Graph 7. 1; 
firms, 
I PFEI 
_I 
I 
23 
The time profile of the average absolute PFE, acrqss all 
I 
11 
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7.2 Investigating the rationality of analysts' forecasts. 
<The time profile of the forecast error <PFE) distribution. 
Results are presented for steps 1 and 2 <see equations 6.4 and 6.11, 
respectively, in chapter 6). 
Step 1. 
The estimates of ex and j3 for the 'all firms' sample <Table 6. 4, panel A) 
show that the mean of the PFE distribution is -0. 05 at the 23-month 
forecast horizon, indicating a bias in analysts' earnings forecasts 
towards under-estimation of 5%, and that this bias declines over time. 
From estimates of J3 for the 'all firms' sample, for forecast period 1 
<Table 6. 5, panel A> and forecast period 2 <Table 6. 6, panel A> it is 
found that all the decline in forecast bias occurs between month -23, 
relative to the announcement month, to month -12. The mean of the PFE 
distribution from month -11 is estimated to be -0.017, indicating bias 
towards under-estimation of only 1.7%, and this bias appears to remain 
through to month -1. The process is illustrated by graph 7.2. 
Graph 7.2: The time profile of the mean of the PFE distribution. 
mean 
PFE 
0 
<bias) 
23 11 1 
'-------' 
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Step 2. 
The variance of the PFE distribution is investigated via the average 
absolute residuals from the regression of PFE on T. The estimate of o 
for all firms, for the overall forecast period <Table 6. 4, panel A), 
shows that the variance of the PFE distribution around the regression 
line, declines over time. The estimates of o for forecast period 1 
<Table 6. 5, panel A) and forecast period 2 <Table 6. 6, panel A) show 
that this decline is quite evenly divided between these two sub-periods. 
The average decline in the variance of the PFE distribution, over time, 
is shown by graph 7.3. 
Graph 7. 3i The time profile of the variance of the PFE distribution 
around the regression line, across all firms. 
I el 
_I 
I 
23 
7.3 The size effect. 
I 
11 
I 
1 <months prior to 
announcement). 
The size effect is investigated with respect to the impounding process, 
and forecast rationality. 
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(i) Impounding process. 
The influence of firm size on the time profile of the average absolute 
PFE is examined by comparing parameter estimates of a and ~ for 'below 
the median' and 'lower quartile' firms with those for 'above the median' 
and 'upper quartile' firms <see Tables 6.1 - 6. 3). The results suggest 
that at the 23 month forecast horizon, the average absolute PFE appears 
to be positively related to firm size. Estimates of ~ in Table 6. 2 
suggest that while the absolute PFE for smaller firms declines steadily 
over time, the absolute PFE for larger firms declines little from month 
-23 to month -12, but declines substantially from month -11 to month -1. 
Graph 7. 4 provides a general illustration of this process. It may be 
noted that adjusted R-square value for the regression of the absolute 
PFE on the time variable T, is negatively related to firm size <see 
Table 6. 1). 
Graph 7. 4; The size effect on the time profile of the average absolute 
I PFEI 
I 
I 
I __ _ 
I 
23 
I 
11 
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(ii) Forecast rationality. 
The influence of the size effect on the time profile of the PFE 
distribution may be investigated by comparing parameter estimates of a 
and ~ <which relate to the mean of the PFE distribution), and 't and o 
<which relate to the variance of the PFE distribution around the 
regression line), for larger and smaller firms (see Tables 6.4- 6.6). 
Parameter estimates of a indicate that bias at both the 23 month <Table 
6. 4) and 11 month <Table 6. 6) horizons, is negatively related to firm 
size. Forecasts for 'upper quartile' and 'above the median' firms are 
unbiased at the 23 month, and 11 month, forecast horizons respectively. 
For smaller firms bias declines over time. A general representation of 
these results is shown by graph 7.5. 
Graph 7.5; The size effect on the time profile of the mean of the PFE 
distribution. 
mean 
PFE 
0 
<bias) 
23 11 1 
<month prior to the 
announcement) . 
s = smaller firms. 
l = larger firms. 
Parameter estimates of 't indicate that at the 23 month <Table 6.4>, and 
11 month <table 6.6), forecast horizons the variance of the PFE 
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distribution around the regression line, is positively related to firm 
size. Although estimates of o <Tables 6.5 and 6.6) indicate that PFE 
variance around the regression line for smaller firms, declines 
steadily over time, it is found that for larger firms, PFE variance 
around the regression line remains unchanged from month -23 to month -12 
<announcement= month 0) but declines rapidly from month -11. Graph 7.6 
illustrates these findings. 
Graph 7. 6; The size effect on the time profile of the variance of the 
PFE distribution around the regression line. 
I el 
I 
I 
23 
DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS. 
I 
11 
I 
1 
s = smaller firms. 
1 = larger firms. 
<months prior to 
announcement). 
The discussion relates to the impounding process, forecast rationality 
and the size effect. 
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(1) The impounding process. 
The time profile of analysts' forecast errors, for the sample of 'all 
firms', shows a systematic decline over time, illustrating the 
impounding process. This is consistent with evidence from Cooper and 
Taylor <1983), Cooper (1984), Brown, Foster and Noreen <1985), O'Brien 
<1988) and Patz <1989). 
<2) Forecast rationality. 
The time profile of the moments of the PFE distribution indicate a 
general tendency for UK analysts to under-estimate earnings. Other 
evidence of this property of UK analysts is provided by Bhaskar and 
Morris <1984) and O'Hanlon and Whiddett <1990). Another UK study, by 
Patz (1989) is inconclusive, finding over-estimation in one year and 
under-estimation in the next. Bias is inconsistent with rational 
forecasts. UK evidence contrasts with US research, presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6, indicating either unbiasedness or a tendency to 
overestimte earnings. 
This study finds that variance of the PFE distribution around the 
regression line, declines systematically over time, consistent with 
forecast efficiency and rationality. The results appear consistent with 
studies by Crichfield, Dyckman and Lakanishak (1978), Elton, Gruber and 
Gultekin (1982) and Brawn, Faster and Noreen <1985) which find that the 
variance of forecasts around the mean, declines aver-time. 
(3) The size effect. 
With reference to the size effect, the findings do nat support the pre-
test expectation, based an US research, that information is impounded 
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earlier for larger firms than for smaller firms. The time profile of 
analysts' forecast errors, as measured by the absolute PFE, indicates 
that forecast errors are positively related to firm size, and that 
forecast errors for smaller firms begin to decline much earlier than 
forecast errors for larger firms. This finding is consistent with the 
UK study by Bhaskar and Morris <1984) who conclude that " .. analysts .. 
appear to have some difficulty in forecasting the profits of the 
largest .. companies as accurately as those for [ smaller 
companies]". <p. 119). However, a UK study by Patz <1989) finds that 
"[the] pre-test expectation that accuracy increases with the size of 
firm was strongly supported," <p. 273), although the significance of 
statistical results supporting this finding appear·. to differ noticably 
between different error metrics. 
With reference to the forecast error <PFE> distribution, bias appears 
to be negatively related to firm size and there is evidence of 
unbiasedness for the forecasts of larger firms, consistent with forecast 
rationality. Although the variance of the forecast error <PFE) 
distribution, declines over time for both larger and smaller firms, it 
appears to be positively related to firm size and begins to decline much 
earlier for smaller firms than for larger firms. This finding is 
consistent with findings by Bhaskar and Morris <1984) who find that the 
variation of forecast errors around zero is greatest for the largest 
firms. 
Possible explanations for the findings of the empirical study in this 
thesis, are provided below. Explanations are provided for bias; the 
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size effect, with respect to the impounding process <investigated via 
forecast accuracy>, and forecast rationality <investigated via the 
forecast error distribution). 
(1) Bias. 
With reference to the finding of a general tendency for UK analysts to 
underestimate, an explanation for UK pessimism, and the contrast with US 
optimism, is given by O'Hanlon and Whiddett (1990): "[It may be that] 
the expected positive payoff to being extreme and right [ isl greater 
than the expected negative payoff to being extreme and wrong in the US 
and [it] is the opposite case in the UK." <p.13). 
(ii) The size effect and impounding. 
The time profile of analysts' forecast errors indicates that information 
is not impounded earlier for larger firms than for smaller firms. 
Indeed the opposite appears to be the case. This contrasts with the 
findings of US research, presented in section 6.3 of chapter 6. 
One possible explanation for this contrast is that accounting 
standards are more precise in the US than in the UK. Young <Davies, 
Pa 't erson and Wilson) <1989) find that these differences are greatest 
with respect to pensions, extraordinary items, and mergers and 
~quisi tions. As a result, US analysts may be able to estimate how a 
given piece of information will be accounted for with greater accuracy 
than their UK counterparts. This greater uncertainty for UK analysts 
may be compounded when estimating earnings for large complex firms, 
hence, the poorer accuracy for larger firms. 
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Another explanation for differences between the UK and US with respect 
to the firm size effect on the impounding process relates to trading 
profits. It may be that the extra profits from trading on information 
about larger firms do not compensate for the extra costs of collecting 
and analysing information about larger, more complex firms, in the UK. 
In the US, however, such information collection for larger firms may be 
worthwhile. 
A possible explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the 
findings of Freeman <1987) and this study is that Freeman investigates 
returns on portfolios of stocks of larger and smaller firms, and not on 
individual stocks. The creation of a portfolio means that the variances 
of returns on individual assets may 'cancel out' and the return on a 
portfolio of assets will usually display less variation than returns on 
individual assets. As a result, the earnings forecast measure that may 
be the equivalent to the portfolio returns studied by Freeman, may be 
the mean PFE, which is the measure used to investigate forecast bias. 
The findings of the empirical study in this thesis indicate that bias is 
negatively related to firm size <i.e. larger firms' forecast become 
unbiased earlier) and this is consistent with the Freeman <1987) 
findings. It may be that this study, by also investigating forecast 
error variance, has investigated a factor ignored by the Freeman study 
because of the 'masking' of individual return variances due to the 
construction of portfolios. 
<iii) The size effect on the forecast error <PFE) distribution. 
One explanation for the influence of firm size on the forecast error 
<PFE) distribution is that, because larger firms tend to be complex 
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conglomerates, it is difficult for analysts to correctly predict the 
implications of news for future earnings. 
especially when segmental information is 
excessive optimism or excessive pessimism. 
News may be misinterpreted, 
poor, leading to either 
This may lead to greater 
variance of the forecast error distribution for larger firms, although 
the mean of the distribution for larger firms may be zero. For less 
complex smaller firms, the implication of news for future earnings may 
be more easily assessed, but because of generally less information being 
available for smaller firms, it may be more difficult to correctly 
predict earnings on average. This implies that analysts may have to 
'stab in the dark', and they may be cautious in doing so. This may 
result in a forecast error distribution which is biased towards 
underestimation, but which has a smaller variance than for larger firms. 
CONCLUSION. 
This study finds little evidence that UK analysts' earnings forecast 
incorporate announcement information earlier for larger firms than for 
smaller firms. Indeed, evidence is consistent with the contrary 
hypothesis. 
Evidence is not particularly supportive of the rationality of UK 
analysts' earnings forecasts across all firms. In general, there 
appears to be a general tendency towards underestimation which, if 
accounted for, may allow UK analysts to improve forecasts. 
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While, there is evidence of unbiasedness for larger firms• earnings 
forecasts, variance of the error <PFE) distribution is larger for larger 
firms. 
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STUDY AND FURTHER RESEARCH. 
This section presents a number of shortcomings of the empirical study 
and suggests further research. 
1. One reservation regarding the empirical study is the use of net-
assets-per-share <NAPS> to define firm size. NAPS is used simply 
because this is the only relevant value, in the data set provided. 
However, studies such as Freeman <1987), Collins, Kothari and Rayburn 
(1987) and Stickel <1989), which present evidence on the influence of 
firm size, define firm size as the market value of equity. Stickel 
<1989) also uses the traded volume of common stock, far a given period, 
as a measure of firm size. The empirical study in this thesis could be 
replicated using these measures of firm size. 
2. Another reservation with respect to the empirical study, is that 
the sample of earnings forecasts only relate to firms in the FTSE-100, 
and it may be that all firms are relatively large. Hence, the 
properties of the samples of smaller firms• forecasts may nat really be 
representative of the properties of forecasts for smaller firms. 
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3. A third shortcoming of the study is that it only uses one error 
metric. The error metric used in this study is the proportionate 
forecast error <PFE>; 
PFE = 
F - A 
A 
Where A = actual annual earnings. 
F = forecast annual earnings. 
The absolute value of the above error metric is used as a measure of 
accuracy, and is the same accuracy measure used by Basi, Carey and Twark 
<1976), Brown and Rozeff <1978), Ruland <1978), and Patz <1989). The 
reasons for using actual earnings as the deflator for the forecast error 
are given in Chapter 6. Studies by Imhoff, Jr. 0978) and Bhaskar and 
Morris <1984), however, deflate the forecast error by the earnings 
forecast, and McNichols <1989) uses a firm's preannouncement share price 
as the deflator for the forecast error. 
The above error metrics correspond to linear loss functions. However, 
if one assumes that investors' loss functions, with respect to analysts' 
earnings forecast errors, are quadratic, then this would correspond to a 
squared-error metric. Examples of these error metrics are the squared 
proportionate forecast error described in equation 4.11 in chapter 4 
and used by Basi, Carey and Twark <1976); the root· mean square error 
used in studies by Cooper and Taylor <1983) and Cooper <1984) <equation 
5. in chapter 5); and an error metric used by Patz <1989), consisting 
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of the squared forecast error deflated by either actual earnings or 
forecast earnings. 
4. If one were to obtain a time-series of forecast and realised 
earnings changes for individual firms, it would be possible to use Theil 
<1966) partial inequality coefficients to decompose forecast errors <see 
Chapter 4). By differentiating firms by size or by industry group, one 
may conclude the degree to which systematic forecast error may be 
influenced by these factors. Theil partial inequality coefficients 
provide an estimate of the proportion of the forecast error that is due 
to a given factor - something not possible with the methodology of the 
empirical study. 
5. Since the empirical study investigates two aspects of forecast 
rationality, namely bias and efficiency, a more extensive investigation 
of rational! ty may be made by utilising tests presented by Sheffrin 
(1983) <pp. 18-19). 
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APPENDIX. 
All firms <years) for which forecasts are obtained for the empirical 
study. 
ALLIED-LYONS <86, 87, 88, 89) 
ARGYLL GROUP (86, 87, 88, 89) 
ASDA GROUP <86, 87, 88, 89) 
ASSD. BRITISH F <86, 87, 88, 89) 
B.A.T. INDUSTRIE (86, 87, 88) 
BAA plc <88, 89) 
BARCLAYS PLC. <86, 88) 
BASS <86, 87, 88) 
BET DFD. <86, 87, 88, 89) 
BICC (86, 87, 88) 
BLUE CIRCLE HlD. <86, 87, 88) 
BOC GROUP <86, 87, 88) 
BOOTS <86, 87, 88, 89) 
BP <86, 87, 88) 
BPB INDUSTRIES <86, 87, 88, 89) 
BRITISH AEROSPA <86, 88) 
BRITISH AIRWAYS <87, 88, 89) 
BRITISH GAS (87, 88, 89) 
BRITISH STEEL <89> 
BRITISH TELECOM <86, 87, 88, 89) 
BTR <86, 87, 88) 
BURMAH OIL <86, 87, 88) 
BURTON GROUP <86, 87, 88) 
CABEL AND WIRELES (86, 87, 88, 89> 
CADBURY SCHWEPP <86, 87, 88) 
COMMERCIAL UNIO <86, 87, 88) 
COOKSON GROUP <86, 87, 88) 
COURTAULDS <86, 87, 88, 89) 
- 126-
ENG.CHINA CLAYS (86, 87, 88) 
ENTERPRISE OIL <87, 88) 
FISONS (86, 87, 88) 
GEC <86, 87, 88, 89) 
GENERAL ACCIDEN <86, 87, 88) 
GKN <86, 87, 88) 
GLAXO HLDGS <86, 87, 88, 89) 
GRANADA GROUP <86, 87, 88) 
GRAND METROPOLI (86, 87, 88) 
GREAT UNIVERSAL (86, 87, 88, 89) 
GUARDIAN ROYAL <86, 87, 88,) 
GUINNESS <86, 87, 88,) 
HAXMERSON PROP. (87, 88,) 
HANSON <86, 87, 88,> 
HAWKER SIDDELEY (86, 87, 88,) 
HILLSDOWN HLDGS (86, 87, 88,) 
ICI (86, 87, 88,) 
KINGFISHER PLC <86, 87, 88, 89) 
LADBROKE <86, 87, 88,) 
LAND SECURITIES (86, 87, 88, 89) 
LEGAL & GENERAL (86, 87, 88,) 
LLOYDS BANK (86, 88,) 
LONRHO (86, 87, 88,) 
LUCAS INDUSTRIE (86, 87, 88, 89) 
MARKS & SPENCER (86, 87, 88, 89) 
MEPC <86, 87, 88,) 
MIDLAND BANK <86, 88,) 
NAT. WEST. BANK <86, 88,) 
P&O STEAM NAVIG <88,) 
PEARSON (86, 87, 88,> 
PILKINGTON (86, 87, 88, 89) 
POLLY PECK (86, 87, 88,) 
PRUDENTIAL CORP (86, 87, 
RACAL ELECTRON! (86, 87, 
RANK ORG. <86, 87, 88,) 
RANKS HOVIS (86, 87, 88,) 
88,) 
88, 89) 
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RECKITT & COLMA <86, 87, 88,) 
REDLAND (86, 87, 88,1 
REED INTL <87, 88, 89) 
REUTERS (86, 87, 88,) 
RMC GROUP <86, 87, 88,) 
ROLLS-ROYCE <87, 88) 
ROTHMANS <86, 87, 88, 89) 
ROYAL BK SCOTLA <86, 87, 88,) 
ROYAL INSURANCE (86, 87, 88,) 
RTZ (86, 87, 88,) 
SAINSBURY (J) (86, 87, 88, 89) 
SCOT.& NEWCASTL <86, 87, 88, 89) 
SEARS (86, 87, 88, 89) 
SHELL <86, 87, 88,) 
SIEBE (87, 88,) 
SMITH & NEPHEW <86, 87, 88,) 
STANDARD CHARTE <86, 88,) 
STC (86, 87, 88,) 
SUN ALLIANCE <86, 87, 88,) 
TARMAC <86, 87, 88,) 
TAYLOR ROODROW <86, 87, 88,) 
TESCO STORES <86, 87, 88, 89) 
THORN EMI <86, 87, 88, 89) 
TRAFALGAR HOUSE (86, 87, 88,) 
TRUSTHOUSE FORT (86, 87, 88,) 
TSB GROUP <86, 87, 88,) 
ULTRAMAR (88') 
UN I LEVER (86, 871 88,) 
UNITED BISCUITS <86, 87, 88,) 
WELLCOME <86, 87, 88,) 
WHITBREAD 'A' <86, 87, 88, 89) 
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